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SB 7: A UNION PERSPECTIVE
By, Mitchell Roth
Mitchell Roth has been General Counsel for the Illinois Education Association-NEA since September
1988. IEA Executive Director Audrey Soglin and he represented the IEA in the SB 7 negotiations. As
general counsel, Mitch has administered a legal services program for over 130,000 members and over
1,000 affiliates, managed an outstanding staff of 20 employees, overseen cases handled by top-notch
in-house attorneys and 10 outside law firms, advised IEA and local affiliates on legal, corporate and
governance matters, and represented and assisted others with IEA on thousands of legislative and other
policy matters. In doing this work, he has had the great fortune of working for individuals engaged in
the most critical profession – public education. He has been able to do so with some of the most
outstanding and progressive union, management and government leaders. But none of his work would
have been possible without the support and balance brought by his family – Wilma, Ben, Nate and
Natalie, of whom he could not be prouder, and by his love of music. Prior to coming to IEA, Mitch was
Staff Counsel for the National Education Association. His educational background is: University of
Wisconsin Law School; Cornell University masters’ program in labor relations; Princeton University
undergraduate.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The narrative is steady. The narrative is loud. It cares little about actions that do
not fit it or evidence that does not support it. “Teachers’ unions are, generally
speaking, a menace and an impediment to [education] reform.”[1]To some, “The
teachers’ unions are the main reason why the quarter-century-long movement to
reform this nation’s schools has been such a disappointment.”[2] The narrative can
certainly find support in some teachers’ unions which have been resistant to
change, most often when change has been done around rather than with unions
and their members. However, the narrative conveniently ignores that the lack of
success of some education reform initiatives is much more complex than whether
teachers’ unions have supported or opposed them.[3] It also ignores that some
teachers’ “unions have actually been at the forefront of educational reform
efforts.”[4] When teachers’ unions and their members have a voice in
collaboratively developing and implementing systemic reforms, improved student
performance often follows.[5] For, as Bill Gates observed, “[i]f reforms aren’t
shaped by teachers’ knowledge and experience, they’re not going to succeed.”[6]
In no state has this narrative been shown to be so misleading, so “sorely
outdated,”[7] than in Illinois. The most striking example undercutting it occurred
on June 13, 2011, in a packed auditorium at Lexington Elementary School in
Maywood, when Gov. Pat Quinn signed SB 7/HB 1197, legislation which
“overhauled state policies on teacher hiring, tenure, reductions in force, and
dismissal.”[8] In attendance were representatives from almost every major
education group in the state, including both the Illinois Education Association
(IEA) and Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT), most all of whom had taken part
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in numerous collaborative meetings over a five and a half month period. Described
as a “sweeping measure that has the potential to significantly reshape the teaching
profession,”[9] it was brought about by “education stakeholders [who]
accomplished something outstanding,” resulting in Illinois being “a national
model for how to operate real change through close collaboration, education, and
advocacy.”[10] As United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan put it:
“Through this very impressive collaboration of school management, teacher
unions, education reform advocates, legislators and the governor, Illinois has
created a powerful framework to strengthen the teaching profession and advance
student learning in Illinois. This is an example that I hope states across the country
will follow.”[11]
At its core, SB 7 elevates the role of teacher performance in major employment
decisions; maintains recognition that seniority still should matter in making these
decisions; streamlines the process for dismissing teachers, particularly when based
on higher quality, more objective evaluations; and adds a dose of public scrutiny
— and thus reality — to the bargaining process. But as important as its substance,
and in many ways inseparable from it, is the collaborative process by which the
legislation was crafted, the success of which was due to several factors:
 The skilled facilitation and focus of Senator Kimberly Lightford, assistant
majority leader and vice chair of the Senate Education Committee and
Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) General Counsel Darren Reisberg;
 The shared purpose of all involved to “do what’s in the best interest of our
kids;”[12]
 An historic coalition of the three major teacher unions (IEA, IFT and the
Chicago Teachers Union (CTU)), each of which were not new to education
reform and had been working for many years on evolving their positions on
such issues;
 Prior education reform legislation that established a solid foundation from
which many of the SB 7 reforms could be built; and
 The strong relationships of those who participated in the process;
relationships built on trust, respect, knowledge and experience.
This article will examine this process throughout discussion of the major
substantive provisions included in SB 7, from my perspective as one of the
participants from the IEA. I hope it adds to the understanding of what the
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language of SB 7 means, what the intent behind the language is, and how strong,
high quality advocates can truly work together to achieve meaningful public policy.
II. UNDERPINNINGS OF SB 7

A quarter-century ago, several individuals[13] in the suburban Chicago area who
were deeply concerned about the gaps in student performance in Illinois and the
systems in public schools inhibiting positive change, created an education reform
organization. That organization has spent the last 25 years significantly affecting
the academic lives of tens of thousands of school children in hundreds of schools
around the state. Founded in 1987, the Consortium for Educational Change (CEC),
a non-profit organization affiliated with the IEA,[14] has worked with teachers,
school and school district administrators, school boards and teacher unions to
improve student learning and achievement.[15] Today, CEC has more than 80
school district members, covering virtually all areas of Illinois, from Antioch
Community Consolidated School District 34 in the very northern part of the state,
to Cairo School District No. 1 in the very southern part of the state.[16] The CEC
assists and supports school districts, schools and their teachers’ unions as they go
through the process of systemic change needed to improve teaching and student
performance.[17]
The IFT and CTU have similar education reform histories. In 1989, the CTU
Development Center for Restructuring was established for its members, parents,
administrators and community leaders to work on implementing reform
legislation.[18] In 1990, IFT held its first QuEST (Quality Education Standards in
Teaching) conference and in 1992 the CTU Quest Center, the education reform arm
of the CTU, was established.[19] All three unions have provided extensive
professional development opportunities for their members, in conjunction with
their involvement in education reform issues.[20]
In 2005, a group of Illinois leaders from business, politics, education and labor,
referred to as the “Education Policy Dialogue Group,” began meeting to discuss
statewide strategies on how best to raise student achievement.[21]Its discussions
led to the creation of the “Burnham Plan for a World-Class Education,” which was
released in May 2007. Applauded by many, including the generally antilabor Chicago Tribune,[22] the Burnham Plan called for such education reforms
as: a better data system to measure student gains and determine teacher and
principal effectiveness, a streamlined process for dismissing poorly performing
teachers, financial rewards for excellent teachers and schools, intensive induction
and mentoring programs for teachers and principals, training for school board
members, and expansion of the number of charter schools permitted in
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Illinois.[23] During the summer of 2007[24] and the spring of 2008,[25] many
parts of the Burnham Plan were incorporated into bills that, in the end, did not
pass the General Assembly. Undeterred, the group refined the original Burnham
Plan and, in anticipation of the federal Race to the Top (RTTT) program, developed
“Burnham 2.0,”[26] which “urge[d] immediate changes in how Illinois education
does business.”[27] The work this group did, the progressive concepts around
which it coalesced and the relationships its members developed set the stage for
education reform initiatives to come.
On July 24, 2009, after some delay, the United States Department of Education
(DoEd) officially issued its proposed RTTT competitive grant guidelines. The $4.3
billion in RTTT monies was part of almost $100 billion in grants and bonding
authority appropriated to the DoEd as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The RTTT grant criteria focused on four areas:
1. Adopting world-class standards and assessments to measure student
achievement against them;
2. Establishing effective data systems to track student growth and link it to the
performance of teachers, principals and ultimately teacher training
programs;
3. Getting the best teachers and principals into the highest-poverty schools and
hardest-to-staff subjects; and
4. Focusing resources on the lowest-achieving 5 percent of schools.[28]
Even before the official guidelines were released, State Superintendent of
Education Chris Koch began to bring together statewide education groups to
discuss how to enhance Illinois’ chances to receive up to $400 million in RTTT
grants. The grants would be awarded in two phases: Phase 1 for which
applications would be due in late 2009/early 2010 and Phase 2 for which
applications would be due sometime in 2010. A focus of these discussions was how
to improve the state’s teacher evaluation system[29] that many believed was
ineffective, subjective, and poorly implemented.[30] Under the RTTT guidelines,
states incorporating measurements of student growth[31]into both their teacher
and principal evaluation systems received higher ratings than states that did
not.[32] While the unions generally were not happy with the existing teacher
evaluation system, they had concerns about using student growth assessments for
high-stakes employment decisions when many researchers were unconvinced of
their reliability and validity.[33] In late November 2009, DoEd issued its final
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RTTT guidelines and application.[34] At that point, the decision was made that
Illinois would apply in the first phase of RTTT grants.[35]
Over the next several weeks, legislators, led by Senator Kimberly Lightford and
state Representatives Roger Eddy and Linda Chapa La Via, representatives from
the governor’s office, ISBE, the IEA, IFT, CTU, the Illinois School Management
Alliance (which is made up of the Illinois Association of School Boards (IASB), the
Illinois Association of School Administrators (IASA), the Illinois Principals
Association (IPA) and the Illinois Association of School Business Officials
(IASBO)), the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and Advance Illinois,[36] worked
diligently and collaboratively to craft a bill to improve teacher and principal
evaluations that would enhance Illinois’ chances to receive RTTT funds.[37] On
Jan. 15, 2010, in time to be included in Illinois’ RTTT application, the Performance
Evaluation Reform Act (PERA)[38] was signed by the governor and became
law.[39]
PERA makes several significant changes to teacher evaluations. First, it requires
that all school districts incorporate measures of student growth into their teachers’
evaluations.[40] While CPS is required to do this by the 2012-2013 school year in
300 of its schools and by 2013-2014 in the remainder of its schools, other Illinois’
school districts will be required to begin using student growth evaluations by either
the 2015-2016 school year (for the lowest performing 20 percent)[41] or the 20162017 school year (for the remainder of school districts).[42] When a school district
must begin using student growth measures as part of a teacher’s evaluation is
called the district’s “PERA Implementation Date.”[43] This phase-in requirement
helped alleviate some concerns IEA and others had about the implementation of
student-growth teacher evaluation measures before enough research was
conducted and experience gained on the validity and reliability of such
measures.[44] Second, beginning September 1, 2012, all evaluators must
successfully complete a pre-qualification program provided by or through ISBE
before they can conduct a valid evaluation.[45] This requirement addressed
concerns IEA and others had that a certain level of evaluation skills should be
required. Third, since 1985 when the teacher evaluation law was first enacted,
school districts have had to, at a minimum, work in good faith with their teachers’
unions in developing their teacher evaluation plans. PERA not only includes in
this requirement developing a plan on how student growth measures will be used
as a significant factor in evaluating their teachers, it specifically requires that
districts use “a joint committee composed of equal representation selected by the
district and its teachers or, where applicable, [its teachers’ union]” in doing
so.[46] PERA specifies what, at a minimum, a school district’s student growth
evaluation plan must include.[47] For those parts of the plan on which the joint
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committee cannot reach agreement, the school district is required to follow what
the State has established,[48] as opposed to allowing the district to implement its
position on the issue.[49] The IEA and other unions believe that this process
provides teachers with a more meaningful voice in the creation of the student
growth evaluation plan than would otherwise have existed under the IELRA, where
the substance of evaluations are permissive subjects of bargaining and thus can be
unilaterally determined by school districts.[50]
By creating a more objective evaluation system, in which teachers and their unions
would have more significant and meaningful input, PERA and the collaborative
process used to develop it established a stronger foundation for both the IEA and
IFT to progressively address other education reform issues. And while both unions
were keenly aware of developments in other states concerning teacher dismissals,
layoffs, pay for performance and tenure,[51]and were engaging their members in
conversations about all of those issues, the timeline in which they would need to
address these issues was a little shorter than expected.
III. PERFORMANCE COUNTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ALL

During the summer of 2010, Stand for Children (SFC),[52] an Oregon-based
school reform group, made its appearance in Illinois. Fresh off its success in
Colorado, where it aggressively and quickly pushed through legislation making
significant changes to teacher tenure, dismissal and layoffs, [53] SFC believed it
had an opportunity[54] to do the same thing in Illinois. The IEA, IFT and other
groups watched SFC establish itself here. In September 2010, SFC formed a
political action committee which, by the beginning of October, had amassed and
distributed more than $600,000 to six Democratic and three Republican state
House candidates in the November 2010 election.[55] On December 3, 2010,
Speaker of the Illinois House Michael Madigan announced the creation of the
bipartisan eight-member Special House Committee on Education Reform for the
96th General Assembly,[56]which would hold subject matter hearings on
December 16 and 17, 2010. The Democrats on the committee were state
Representatives Linda Chapa La Via, as co-chair, and Keith Farnham, Jehan
Gordon,[57] and Karen Yarborough; the Republicans on the committee were
Representatives Roger Eddy, as co-chair, and Robert Pritchard, Darlene Senger
and Edward Sullivan.[58] On December 8, 2010, the Illinois Senate created its own
Special Committee on Education Reform. Named to that committee were
Democratic Senators Kimberly Lightford, co-chair, and Edward Maloney, and
Republican Senators Bradley Burzynski, co-chair, and David Luechtefeld.[59]
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A little over a week after the House committee was created, a coalition of groups,
headed by SFC and Advance Illinois, and including the Illinois Business
Roundtable[60] and the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of
Chicago,[61] formally released draft legislation entitled the “Performance Counts
Act of 2010” (PC).[62] Many of the PC proposals (all of which focused on K-12
public education) formed the basis of testimony at the House committee
hearings. Among the proposals were:
1.

Revocation of a teacher’s or principal’s certificate for three unsatisfactory
evaluations in a 10-year period;

2. Selection of teachers to fill new or vacant positions in a school based on merit,
as determined solely by the school principal or district superintendent in
accordance with school board policies, and limiting the use of seniority in the
selection process to a discretionary tiebreaker;
3. Acquisition of tenure by a teacher based on four satisfactory or better
performance evaluations over an indefinite number of years;
4. Layoff of teachers based on a process developed by the school district, in
consultation but not through bargaining with the union, in which
a. prior performance, as determined by the district (with performance
evaluations being the predominant factor in determining prior
performance) controlled who would be laid off and
b. seniority could only be considered as a tie-breaker;
5. No recall rights for teachers who were laid off (laid off teachers could apply
and would be considered first by the district);
6. A tenured teacher dismissal process for unsatisfactory performance where
a. the teacher could appeal her dismissal to a school district panel made
up of two district representatives and one union representative,
b. the teacher and school district would each have two days to present
their case at the hearing and
c. the burden would be on the teacher to show that the evaluation on
which the dismissal was based was not valid or appropriate;
7. Prior to being able to strike, a union would have to go through an elongated
fact-finding[63] process with a strike allowed only if the school board did not
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accept its own final offer presented to the fact-finder, the fact-finder’s
recommendation or the union’s final offer;
8. Loss of payroll deduction and IELRB certification for a union engaging in an
illegal strike; and
9. Changing many mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining in Chicago
to prohibited subjects of bargaining.[64]
The message accompanying these proposals was that PC was on a fast track, and
that the intent was to pass major education reform legislation before the 96th
General Assembly adjourned on Jan. 11, 2011.
Needless to say, while the IEA and IFT had worked with others in thoughtfully
developing and implementing reforms, the extreme nature and aggressiveness of
the PC proposals, and the expeditious process by which they were intended to be
considered, left the clear message that those who developed and supported PC
intended to ram it through the General Assembly in the first week of January 2011,
with minimal if any modification.[65] However, the PC coalition wasn’t the only
coalition on the block. As described earlier in this article, even before PC was
released, the IEA, IFT and CTU had worked together on education reform and
other issues. The leadership of all three organizations, IEA President Ken Swanson
and Executive Director Audrey Soglin, IFT President Dan Montgomery, and CTU
President Karen Lewis[66], realized that they clearly needed to coalesce their
efforts in addressing the PC proposal. Together they prepared for and testified at
the December 16 and 17, 2010 House committee hearings, articulating their strong
concerns with much of the PC proposal, and arguing that more time was needed to
thoughtfully and collaboratively develop effective reform legislation.[67] Over the
next two weeks, the three unions mobilized their membership to contact
legislators, conducted member surveys and met with each other numerous times.
Based on internal discussions, organizational policies and positions and research
by others outside their organizations, they crafted and released, on January 3,
2011, draft legislation which they believed was “an important step forward to
guaranteeing that schools, districts, and the state share[d] responsibility for
student success.”[68] Entitled “Accountability for All” (AFA), the unions’ plan
proposed, among other things, the following:
1. Mandate training of school board members on education and labor law,
financial oversight and fiduciary responsibilities;
2. Review and recommend comprehensive changes to the Illinois Student
Report Card;
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3. Develop rules regarding how multiple unsatisfactory performance
evaluations for teachers and administrators completed under PERA would
affect teaching certificates;
4. Implement and fund rigorous new teacher induction and mentoring
programs in school districts;
5. Give equal weight to performance evaluations completed under PERA and
seniority in filling new and vacant teaching positions through a process jointly
developed by a school district and union;
6. Give equal weight to performance evaluations completed under PERA and
seniority in laying off and recalling teachers, with teacher salary and benefits
prohibited from being considered through a process jointly developed by
school district and union;
7. Streamline the tenured teacher dismissal process, but maintain appeal to an
independent hearing officer to make the dismissal decision;
8. Provide tenure to a teacher based on three satisfactory or better performance
evaluations completed under PERA in a four-year probationary period, with
a. tenure granted in three years if all of a teacher’s evaluations have been
satisfactory or better and
b. tenure granted in two years if all of a teacher’s evaluations have been
satisfactory or better and she had attained tenure in a prior school
district;
9. Require a school district to reemploy a non-tenured teacher who received an
excellent evaluation;
10. Require written reasons for not reemploying a non-tenured teacher who
received a satisfactory or better evaluation; and
11. Create a student bill of rights requiring a qualified teacher in every classroom
on day one of a school year, and a rich curriculum for every student.[69]
Despite the unions’ involvement in education reform initiatives and legislation
over the years, AFA’s release surprised many, not only because the unions had
come together behind it, but also because of the proposal’s substance. The unions
and their membership showed that they were ready to engage in discussions
regarding the role of performance in layoffs and tenure.[70] They also provided
legislators and others who understood the complexity of these education reform
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issues and believed that teachers’ voices had to be heard in order to most effectively
address them with the support they needed.[71]
On the day AFA was released, the Senate Special Committee on Education Reform,
co-chaired by Senator Lightford, held its first hearing on the PC legislation. The
three unions testified at that hearing, sharing the substance of their education
reform proposal and imploring that time be taken to thoughtfully and
collaboratively process the very important issues raised. Senator Lightford, who
had actively led negotiations on several education reform matters over a number
of years, also believed that the process needed to be slowed, and that all interested
parties needed to be brought to the table, with the goal of producing legislation for
the Spring 2011 General Assembly session. Due to her efforts, the unions’ work in
developing AFA and the activism of their members, PC was not passed before the
96th General Assembly adjourned on January 11, 2011.[72]
IV. INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS BRING RESULTS

The stage was now set for several months of intense work. Under Senator
Lightford’s leadership, the Senate special committee held approximately 10
meetings, attended by representatives from most major education groups in the
state.[73] ISBE General Counsel Darren Reisberg, who worked closely with
Senator Lightford and the Senate special committee, also held regular meetings
attended by a smaller group, where more in depth discussions occurred on
issues. Additionally, a core group of attorneys consisting of Reisberg, Jon Furr,
former ISBE general counsel and partner in the law firm of Holland & Knight,
representing the PC Coalition, IASA General Counsel Sara Boucek, representing
school management, and IEA General Counsel Mitchell Roth, representing the
three unions, devoted hundreds of hours to working through issues too complex to
resolve in larger group discussions and drafting legislative language reflecting
agreements which had been reached.[74] Underlying all the work done were scores
of meetings and conference calls, in which each coalition, whether it was the
unions, PC or school management, internally processed, honed and crafted their
positions.
By mid-April, agreement was reached on a wide range of issues, from changes to
the State School Report Card[75] to teacher layoffs to bargaining impasse
procedures. The ability for all to come together was a testament to several
factors. First, it was the driving passion of Senator Lightford to do what is best for
public school students.[76] This has been her focus, both legislatively and
personally, for many years.[77] To achieve this, she has consistently followed her
belief that those who work in the schools know best how to make them work. To
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the unions and their members, this means that she has always made sure that their
voices are heard and their expertise considered. Having her spearhead these
discussions, with the support of Senate Pres. John Cullerton, gave them certainty
that the process would be fair. Second, she and Mr. Reisberg kept the work of the
groups focused, politically realistic and moving forward. As one commentator
observed, Senator “Lightford was not shy about pushing back when she thought
any party was overreaching, and over the course of the process, she forced each of
the parties to back down from initial positions.”[78]
Third, for the unions, the work they had done over the years on other education
reform initiatives and in engaging their memberships in discussions which evolved
their positions on many critical issues, provided the flexibility to find common
ground. Fourth, most everyone realized that some type of agreement had to be
reached,[79] and that holding intractable positions would likely lead to legislation
which would be harder for their constituencies to accept. Fifth, as discussed earlier,
the creation of a stronger and fairer performance evaluation system under PERA
provided the unions with a solid base from which to agree to new ways, in
particular, of handling teacher layoffs. Sixth, the relationships that had been built
over the years between individuals who played critical roles in the negotiations
were key. From prior experience in working on other education legislation, they
respected each other’s intellectual honesty and integrity. They knew they could
trust each other while having open conversations about possible solutions to
complex issues. They all shared the same goal: to accomplish something that
would in practice improve public education in the state. Without this, they would
not have been able to reach the agreements they did.[80]
On April 14 and 15, 2011, the Illinois Senate passed the agreed-upon
legislation.[81] The legislation addressed the following issues: Survey of learning
conditions in every school; school board member training; action regarding a
teacher or administrator certificate for incompetency; filling of new and vacant
teaching positions; acquisition of tenure; layoff (reduction in force) of teachers;
tenured teacher dismissal procedures; scope of bargaining in CPS; impasse
procedures; and the right to strike, including the membership vote need for CTU
to strike. Over the following several weeks, as the Illinois House prepared to
consider the legislation, a number of problems arose, including whether the House
might seek to amend the bill.[82] Some of the language drafted at the eleventh
hour did not accurately reflect what the parties had understood they agreed
to.[83] Further negotiations, particularly between CPS and CTU representatives,
resolved these problems, resulting in SB 7 being passed by the House without any
changes on May 12, 2011,[84] followed on May 31, 2011, by HB 1197,[85] which
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addressed the problems which had arisen.[86] On June 13, 2011, Governor Quinn
signed both bills.[87]
V. SB 7: LAYOFFS, IMPASSE PROCEDURES AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, TENURED
TEACHER DISMISSAL AND ACQUISITION OF TENURE

While SB 7 makes multiple changes to the Illinois School Code and Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act, this article focuses on the changes which have
received the most significant attention around the state, and have generated the
greatest interest among union members: teacher layoffs (or reductions-in-force);
impasse procedures and the right to strike; tenured teacher dismissal; and
acquisition of tenure.[88] Unless otherwise noted, the discussion centers on
changes applicable to school districts other than CPS.
A.

Reduction-in-force

Prior to SB 7, teacher layoffs, or reductions-in-force (RIFs),[89] due to a school
district’s decision to decrease the number of teachers employed or discontinue a
particular type of teaching program, were generally based upon what
certifications and legal qualifications a teacher possessed, whether the teacher was
tenured or non-tenured, and how much seniority a teacher had in the school
district.[90] It was a seniority-based layoff system established in state law. Before
laying off any tenured teacher because the district was reducing the number of
positions, a school district would have to first layoff any non-tenured teachers who
held a position for which the tenured teacher was certified and legally qualified to
hold. If a district got to the point where tenured teachers had to be laid off, the
teacher with the least seniority in the district would be laid off first, the teacher
with the next least seniority laid off second, etc. For example, if a district decided
for financial reasons that it had to decrease the number of English positions by
one, among the teachers currently filling those positions, anyone who was
nontenured would be first to go. If all were tenured, then the teacher with the least
seniority would lose her position. However, if she were qualified to teach another
subject, for example Social Studies, she would be able to replace or “bump” any
nontenured teacher or tenured teacher with less seniority who was teaching Social
Studies. A school district and union could agree in a collective bargaining
agreement to an alternative method of determining the sequence of layoffs, but it
had to use criteria as objectively-based as seniority.[91]
Such seniority-based layoff systems have been under attack for years. The
argument is that “[s]eniority makes [school districts] ‘fire good teachers’ simply
because they don’t have enough experience.”[92] And while seniority has for years
“been considered a fair and impartial way of proceeding”[93] and some studies

SPRING 2012

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

15

have shown a correlation between seniority and teacher quality,[94] support of
continued use of seniority-based systems has been weakening, even among union
members, when there is an objectively-based alternative.
One of PC’s major proposals was to eliminate the required use of seniority in
RIFs. Instead, teacher RIFs would be based on a teacher’s prior performance,
using evaluation ratings as the predominant factor in determining performance,
teacher certifications and qualifications. In its discretion, a school district could
consider other factors determined by the district to be in its best interests and
seniority or tenured status, but only as a tie-breaker. This proposed new procedure
would not be a mandatory subject of bargaining, but instead would be developed
“in consultation” with the district’s teachers. [95]
In AFA, the unions countered with a proposal in which RIFs would be based on
teacher certifications and legal qualifications, a teacher’s last two performance
evaluations, one of which would have been completed under the new PERA
evaluation law, and seniority, with evaluations being given significant but no more
than equal weight to all other factors. The weight given to performance evaluations
would have to be agreed to by the district and union. Out of a concern that
lessening the role of seniority while including performance evaluations as a
significant factor could result in districts deciding to give more senior, more
highly-compensated teachers lower evaluation ratings in order to RIF them and
save money, AFA’s proposal prohibited the cost of a teacher’s salary and benefits
from being a factor in deciding who to RIF.[96]
The union’s proposal was a major step away from a seniority-based layoff system,
and served as a basis from which discussions could progress. several factors made
it possible. First, the internal discussions the unions had and continued to have
among their members on this issue led to them to modify prior positions. Second,
both within Illinois and in other states, it was becoming clearer that elected
officials’ support for a pure seniority-based layoff process was eroding.[97] Third,
and most critical, was PERA and how it was being implemented: the enhanced
training and skills which all evaluators would need to have in order to perform
teacher evaluations, beginning with the 2012-2013 school year; and the eventual
move to a more objective evaluation system, developed jointly by teachers and
administrators in each school district, based upon 1) how students’ performance
improved in a teacher’s classroom measured by assessments other than state tests
and 2) objective evidence as opposed to subjective assessment of how a teacher
performs.[98]
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The unions’ receptivity to significant consideration of performance in RIF
decisions opened the door to full and far-reaching discussions on how best to
structure such a system. In addition to the concern that some districts might use
evaluation as a tool to get rid of more-senior teachers because of their cost, the
unions were also concerned, for example, that under the PC proposal, districts
could decide to RIF teachers based solely on their most recent evaluation and not
on a broader assessment of teachers’ performances. Teachers who had excellent
evaluations but changed assignments or had to use a new curriculum in their
evaluation year could receive a lower evaluation and thus be more vulnerable to
layoff. The result “would be a huge disincentive for teachers to take on new
challenges that might be good for their long-term development [and the
development of their students] but in the short term lead to lower evaluation
marks.”[99] Additionally, the PC proposal provided no statutory minimums
regarding the criteria and procedures which districts could develop, without
anything more than “consultation” with their teachers. The unions strongly felt
some state-level framework was required, with flexibility for local districts and
their teachers to modify the state scheme to best meet their needs. The PC coalition
and school management wanted a performance versus seniority-based layoff
process in effect as soon as possible, so that more good teachers would not be
RIFed just because they lacked the seniority. When it came to assessing whether
a teacher was qualified for a particular position in a school district, they also argued
that districts should be allowed to require qualifications above and beyond the
minimums established by the State.[100]
Those involved in the negotiations truly listened to one another. The result is a
statutory framework which places teachers into four performance groups based
primarily on their last two evaluations and sorts teachers within the highest three
groups based on their seniority.[101] It empowers local school districts and their
teachers, through a joint committee composed of equal representation,[102] to
modify the criteria for placing teachers in three of the four performance groups
based upon local considerations. These components address the unions’ concerns
over having a teacher’s fate determined by one evaluation with at best
discretionary consideration of seniority and the lack of local flexibility to make
modifications, particularly for teachers who take on new responsibilities.[103] In
addition, if members of the joint committee have a good faith belief that a
disproportionate number of senior teachers have received recent evaluations lower
than their prior ones, they can request and receive from the district relevant data
to review and then issue a report to the school board and union. [104] While not
the outright prohibition on salary and benefit cost as a factor in layoffs, the unions
accepted the joint committee review and report, combined with the increased
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objectivity of evaluations and laws regarding age and union discrimination, as
sufficient protection. The unions have committed to their members to carefully
review and, if called for, to take appropriate legal action where their leaders or
more senior members receive lower evaluations and are laid off. Bumping rights
were maintained, so that a teacher who is laid off from one position but is qualified
for another can bump a teacher in a lower performance group or in the same
performance group with less seniority.[105] School districts got the flexibility to
require additional qualifications beyond state minima for teaching positions, but
such qualifications have to be in a job description for the relevant position by May
10 prior to the year in which layoffs are determined.[106] Finally, existing
collective bargaining agreements with language on determining which teachers are
laid off and recalled were grandfathered until June 30, 2013 or contract
termination date, whichever is earlier.[107]
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The following charts depict how teachers are grouped and then sorted for RIFs:

How this new framework is implemented will be critical. One implementation
issue is the development of the RIF list. In mid-size to large school districts,
establishing the list will be more difficult. To aid districts in this responsibility, the
Illinois Association of School Administrators has developed an excellent program
which reflects the nuances of the law.[108] As with the seniority lists which were
part of the former RIF process, RIF lists are to be developed in consultation with
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the local teachers’ union, if one exists. Unlike those seniority lists, the RIF lists
may not be publicly posted so that individual teachers can be identified, because
they reflect each teacher’s last two or three evaluations. The lists can, however, be
provided to the teachers’ union.[109] As teachers have the legal responsibility to
review their placement on the RIF list,[110] school districts should also provide
each teacher with his/her RIF grouping information, including the evaluation and
seniority information used to place the teacher. In addition, because seniority
continues to have a role not only in RIFs, but often other employment decisions
and benefits, districts should continue to maintain seniority lists.
Other implementation issues will undoubtedly occur. The statewide school
management groups, particularly IASA, and IEA and IFT, have vowed to work
together as much as possible to assure successful implementation not only in the
area of RIFs, but other SB 7 areas. ISBE has developed an extensive guidance
document to assist school districts, teachers and unions in implementing SB 7.[111]
B.

Impasse Procedures and the Right to Strike

As mentioned earlier in this article, neither the unions, in AFA, nor the School
Management Alliance proposed any changes to the IELRA. However, PC proposed
several major changes to the IELRA for K-12 school districts: converting many
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining in Chicago to prohibited subjects
of bargaining; requiring a union, prior to being able to strike, to go through an
elongated fact-finding process and banning strikes unless the school board took
the highly unlikely step of not choosing to accept its own final offer presented to
the fact-finder, the fact-finder’s recommendation or the union’s final offer; and
penalizing a union for engaging in an illegal strike, by stripping it of its IELRB
certification as the exclusive bargaining representative and taking away its ability
to collect union dues through payroll deduction.[112] Claiming that their proposals
would “put student well-being at the center of contract negotiations” and assure
the public that “every effort has been made to reach a settlement before the
negotiation process is allowed to disrupt communities,” PC further asserted that
the proposal “does not prohibit strikes, but proposes fact-finding as a preventative
measure.”[113] Quite to the contrary, the PC proposals would have “effectively
eliminate[d] the legal strike,”[114] sending labor relations in Illinois back to preIELRA days, when strikes, although illegal, occurred in significantly greater
numbers than they have since the IELRA was passed, particularly over the last 10
years.[115] Needless to say, the unions strongly opposed the PC proposals
regarding the IELRA.
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In conducting the SB 7 negotiations, Senator Lightford prioritized and had the
parties discuss those issues on which more than one party had offered a
proposal. She keenly saw that these were areas in which compromise could most
likely be achieved. Therefore, changes to the IELRA were left to the very
end.[116] While the unions continued to oppose any changes, it became clear that
some were going to happen.[117] In supporting its extreme mandatory fact-finding
proposal, PC had stressed how it would bring “transparency” to the bargaining
process, because the findings of the fact-finding panel would be published in
newspapers, thus allowing the public to debate the issues. This would ensure that
the parties presented reasonable offers.[118] The unions did not disagree that
some public airing of each party’s positions on unresolved issues after a period of
good faith bargaining might be helpful to the negotiations process. They and
others[119] believed, however, that mandatory fact-finding, particularly the one
proposed by PC, would significantly hurt the bargaining process.[120]
As a result, SB 7 does not include mandatory fact-finding for school
districts[121] outside of Chicago.[122] Instead, it requires such districts and their
unions, at a point after mediation has begun but negotiations have bogged down,
to publicly post their existing positions on unresolved issues.[123] It was added for
three primary purposes: 1) to make the collective bargaining process in k-12 school
districts more transparent to the public; 2) to equally pressure both employers and
unions to be more realistic in their bargaining positions; and 3) to provide the
parties, once their last offers were posted, the opportunity to continue negotiating
if at all possible, with the added dynamic of the public now knowing what each
party’s last positions were on unresolved issues. The intent was simple: establish
a process in k-12 negotiations which would enhance the likelihood of an agreement
and decrease the likelihood of a strike, without tipping the bargaining scale toward
one party or the other. The drafters’ goal was to minimize disruption of the k-12
educational process. Their belief was that doing so, along with the other changes
made by SB 7, would be a positive step toward enhancing k-12 student learning
and achievement.
This subsection applies by its very language and was intended by the drafters to
apply only to public school districts other than CPS, or a combination of public
schools districts:
(a-5) This subsection (a-5) applies only to collective bargaining between a public school
district or a combination of public school districts, including but not limited to, joint
cooperatives, that is not organized under Article 34 of the School Code and an exclusive
representative of its employees.
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It does not apply nor was it intended by the drafters to apply to community colleges
or four-year higher education institutions. That is why the above language was
chosen instead of making the subsection applicable to bargaining between an
exclusive bargaining representative and an educational employer, which is in
relevant part defined in Section 2(a) of the IELRA as: “…the governing body of a
public school district,…combination of public school districts,…public community
college district or State college or university….”[124] If the broader term
“educational employer” had been used in subsection (a-5), it would have applied
to all entities which fall within the meaning of that term. However, that is not what
the drafters intended, and it is not what the General Assembly enacted in SB 7.
The process required in subsection (a-5) is modeled in significant part after a
similar public posting statute in Oregon.[125] Both statutes provide that any time
15 days after the commencement of mediation, either party may initiate the public
posting process by declaring impasse. Notification of such impasse must be
immediately provided to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB),
with copies to the other party and the mediator. Within seven days of this
declaration, each party must submit to the mediator, the IELRB and each other
their final offers on each unresolved issue, including cost summaries for those
which are financial. If, seven days after the IELRB has received these offers, the
parties have not notified the IELRB that they have reached agreement, the IELRB
will post the offers on its website. A union may not strike until the offers have been
posted for 14 days.[126]While subsection (a-5) does not specify and the drafters
did not specifically discuss how the parties must submit their offers, the subsection
does set specific timelines, i.e., the offers must be provided within seven days of
the declaration of impasse and the IELRB must publicly post the offers seven days
after receiving them, if agreement is not reached.
The purposes behind this process, as well as the Oregon statute upon which it is in
part modeled, are to increase the transparency of negotiations, equally pressure
both parties to be more realistic in their bargaining positions and provide the
parties with an opportunity to negotiate knowing that their positions will shortly
be or already have been made known to the public. Subsection (a-5) demonstrates
this intent to encourage the parties to continue negotiating during this period:
“[T]he Board shall make public the final offers… [on] those issues on which the
parties have failed to reach agreement…, unless otherwise notified…that
agreement has been reached.”[127] Thus, the use of the terms “impasse” and “final
offer” are not meant as a statutory determination that, upon initiation of the public
posting process, an employer may unilaterally implement its final offers.[128] Nor
are they meant to be a statutory determination that the “totality of circumstances”
standard set forth by the IELRB in Kewanee Community Unit School District
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229,[129] is no longer valid.[130] If they were interpreted in such a way, it would
negate the purposes for which the public posting subsection was inserted in the
first place.[131]
Other than minor changes to the timelines for filing certain negotiation notices
with the IELRB,[132] SB 7 made no other changes to the IELRA as it applies to
school districts, other than CPS, and unions, other than CTU. None of the strike
penalty provisions proposed by PC were included. For CPS and
CTU[133] specifically, however, SB 7 made several significant additional
changes.[134] As mentioned earlier, CPS and CTU are now required to go through
mandatory fact-finding instead of the public posting process applicable to other
school districts and their unions.[135] Although the mandatory fact-finding
process applicable to CPS is somewhat less onerous than the one proposed by PC,
particularly in that it does not empower CPS to unilaterally end the fact-finding
process and the union’s right to strike by accepting the fact-finder’s
recommendation or even its own,[136] it effectively delays a CPS-union’s ability to
strike for four months from the date the fact-finding panel is
appointed.[137] Additionally, SB 7 provides that for any CPS-unionized employees
to strike, at least three-fourths of all bargaining unit employees who are members
of the union must vote in favor of striking.[138] While some have questioned how
the unions could have accepted these changes,[139] the reality was that the
greatest concern of PC and others in support of it was a CTU strike, which they
wanted to either eliminate or lessen the likelihood of occurring. The unions, and
in particular CTU, believed that the changes made were the better alternative for
CPS unions and their members.[140]
As discussed earlier, the length of the CPS school day and school year drove
another SB 7 change. Decisions on the length of that day and year are now
specifically listed as permissive subjects of bargaining under Section 4.5 (a) of the
IELRA.[141] Once the current CTU-CPS collective bargaining agreement expires
this year,[142] CPS will not have to bargain a decision to increase the school day or
year. However, the impact of that decision remains a mandatory subject of
bargaining. All the other PC proposals to convert many mandatory and permissive
subjects of bargaining in Chicago to prohibited subjects of bargaining were
dropped.
Changes were also made to Section 4.5(b) of the IELRA. That subsection provides
that while CPS and the Chicago City Colleges are required to bargain the impact of
decisions involving the permissive subjects of bargaining listed in Section 4.5(a) of
the IELRA, disputes or impasses over that specific bargaining are to be resolved
exclusively through a special dispute resolution process provided for in Section
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12(b) of the IELRA in lieu of the right of the union to strike.[143] SB 7 added
language clarifying that neither the IELRB nor a mediator or fact-finder appointed
under the new fact-finding procedure established for CPS shall have jurisdiction
over the specific disputes and impasses covered by Section 4.5(b).[144]
C.

Tenured Teacher Dismissal

All parties to the SB 7 negotiations believed that changes were needed in the
process for dismissing tenured teachers for poor performance. All felt that the
process took too long and cost too much.[145] Where they differed was how to
reduce both time and cost. PC and the School Management Alliance also believed
that the process delegated too much authority to someone other than the school
district – an independent hearing officer — to determine whether the teacher
would be dismissed.[146] The unions believed that having an independent
decision maker was a fair and objective check on a school district’s decision.
The then-existing process provided that if teachers who were unsatisfactorily
evaluated and failed to successfully complete a 90-school day remediation period
would be dismissed. The teacher could appeal[147] that dismissal to an
independent hearing officer usually mutually-chosen by the parties from a list
provided by ISBE,[148] who would hold a hearing and decide whether the teacher
should be dismissed or retained by the school district. No time limits were
practically placed on when the hearing would start,[149] how long it would take
and when it would end. This tended to result in drawn out and costly proceedings
when a hearing actually occurred.[150] Whoever was dissatisfied with the hearing
officer’s decision could then appeal it through the state court system. Overall, the
system needed improvement.
PC’s approach to improvement was to create a system which was immensely tilted
toward school districts.[151] Under its proposal, the teacher could appeal her
dismissal to a school district panel composed of two district representatives and
one union representative, the teacher and school district would each have two days
to present their case at the hearing and the burden would be on the teacher to show
that the evaluation on which the dismissal was based was not valid or
appropriate. This panel would then recommend to the school board whether to
dismiss the teacher, retain the teacher or demote the teacher to non-tenured status
but still retain her.[152]The independent hearing officer was nowhere to be
seen. The unions’ approach, as set out in AFA, applied to both dismissals for
unsatisfactory performance and misconduct. It 1) kept the independent hearing
officer who would decide whether the teacher would be dismissed and not just
make a recommendation to the school district, 2) required the hearing to start 75
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days and finish 120 days after the hearing officer was appointed, 3) mandated both
parties to share all relevant evidence with each other no less than 15 days prior to
the beginning of the hearing, 4) maintained the burden of proof on the district and
5) limited each party to four days to present a case at the hearing. The unions’
goal was to streamline the process, while maintaining fairness and objectivity.
What resulted was turning one dismissal process into three: one for dismissals
based upon misconduct (also called dismissals for cause), one for dismissals based
upon unsatisfactory performance evaluations and one for dismissals based upon
unsatisfactory performance evaluations completed after a school district
implements the PERA evaluation system.[153] The latter process is an option
which school districts may choose but are not required to use in place of the other
performance evaluation process.[154] All three processes are similarly
streamlined, requiring the hearing to begin within 75 days and finish within 120
days of the independent hearing officer’s appointment, mandating the sharing of
all relevant evidence, keeping the burden of proof on the school district and a
limitation on the number of days each party has to present a case (no more than
three days each for misconduct and regular performance evaluation
dismissals,[155] no more than two days each for PERA-evaluation
dismissals[156]). Beginning with dismissals occurring on and after July 1, 2012,
the cost of the hearing officer will be equally split between the parties, unless the
teacher opts to have the school district pay the whole cost.[157] If the teacher
chooses to have the school district pay the whole cost, then the district alone selects
the hearing officer from the list maintained by ISBE,[158] instead of the teacher
and district mutually-selecting someone. All hearing officers, beginning
September 1, 2012, must have successfully completed training provided or
approved by ISBE, so that they are “familiar with issues generally involved in
[performance evaluation and misconduct dismissals].”[159]
There are some differences between the three processes. First, for dismissals
based on unsatisfactory performance, the independent hearing officer makes the
final decision, which can then be appealed through the state court system (starting
with the circuit court) using a manifest weight of the evidence standard. For both
misconduct and PERA-evaluation dismissals, the independent hearing officer
makes findings of fact and a recommendation to the school district. The district
then has 45 days to make the final decision.[160]
In misconduct dismissals, the school district is bound by the hearing officer’s
findings of fact unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. If the
school district dismisses a teacher when the hearing officer recommended the
teacher be retained, the district must issue a written decision with reasons.[161] If
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the teacher appeals the decision (starting with the circuit court), the district’s
written decision and the hearing officer’s recommendation are both considered by
the court under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. This safeguard was
critical to the unions agreeing to the hearing officer making a dismissal
recommendation as opposed to the actual decision.[162] If the hearing officer
recommends dismissal and the school district dismisses the teacher, then only the
district’s decision is reviewed on appeal.
In PERA-evaluation dismissals, as with regular performance evaluation
dismissals, a tenured teacher will go through a 90-day remediation period
following an unsatisfactory evaluation. During that remediation period, the
teacher will be evaluated at 45 days and 90 days. If at the end of the remediation
period the teacher does not receive a proficient or better evaluation, she will be
dismissed.[163] During the remediation period, if a school district chooses to use
the PERA-evaluation dismissal process, the district must select an individual,
other than the one who gave the teacher the initial unsatisfactory evaluation, to
either perform the official 45 day and 90 day evaluations or conduct an
“independent assessment” of the teacher’s performance during that
period.[164] This individual is called the “second evaluator,” and cannot be the
evaluator who gave the teacher the unsatisfactory evaluation or someone who
reports to that person.[165] The school district selects the second evaluator
through a process developed in good faith cooperation with the local union, from
a list which includes both district and union appointees.[166] If the second
evaluator performs the official remediation evaluations, the school district is
bound by those evaluations. If the second evaluator finds the teacher successfully
remediated her performance,[167] the district must retain her. If the second
evaluator finds the teacher has not successfully remediated, the district must
dismiss her. If the second evaluator conducts an independent assessment of the
teacher’s performance and finds the teacher successfully remediated, but the
school district still dismisses the teacher, the district must demonstrate to the
hearing officer why its assessment of the teacher’s performance is more valid than
the second evaluator’s assessment. In addition to the use of the second evaluator,
only school board members trained in the PERA evaluation law[168] may vote on
whether to dismiss the teacher. Furthermore, under the PERA-evaluation
dismissal process, the hearing is shorter (two days v. three days for each party to
present a case), the scope of the hearing is more restricted than in a regular
evaluation dismissal[169] and, if a teacher appeals the district’s dismissal decision,
the appeal goes directly to the appellate court, as opposed to the circuit court, and
the standard of review is limited if the hearing officer recommended
dismissal.[170]
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Overall, SB 7 streamlines the tenured teacher dismissal process, builds in greater
protections for teachers in those situations where the hearing officer no longer
makes the dismissal decision but instead makes a recommendation to the school
district, and adds a level of independent assessment of a remediating teacher that
never before existed. All of these factors, along with the enhancement to the
quality of evaluators and the objectivity of the evaluation process made by the
PERA law, provided all three unions with a sufficient basis to agree to these
changes.
D.

Tenure Acquisition

It might surprise some that public school teachers in Illinois do not earn
“tenure.” What they earn is “contractual continued service”[171] which,
nonetheless, is commonly called tenure.[172] Since 1998, a teacher has had to
complete four consecutive school terms (school term is essentially the same as
school year and the terms will be used interchangeably in this article) of full-time
service (commonly called the “probationary period”) and be re-employed for a fifth
school term to acquire tenure.[173] At the end of any of the first three years, all a
district had to do to dismiss the teacher for the following school year was provide
a written notice of nonrenewal at least 45 days before the end of the school term.
No specific reasons or cause had to be provided. If such nonrenewal occurred at
the end of the fourth year, the district had to provide a specific written reason or
reasons for the nonrenewal.[174] However, as long as a school district provided a
specific written reason which fairly apprised the teacher of the basis for
nonrenewal and which was not discriminatory, arbitrary or in violation of the state
or federal constitution, its decision was almost invariably safe from challenge.[175]
While one would assume that a school district would not from year to year make a
decision to renew or not renew a teacher without basing it on an assessment of how
the teacher was performing, nothing in the law clearly required that. And, as what
was anecdotally shared during the SB 7 negotiations, some school districts did not
annually evaluate their non-tenured or probationary teachers, let alone base their
renewal/nonrenewal decisions on evaluations. All parties to the SB 7 negotiations
were united in making changes to how tenure is acquired. They wanted
evaluations to play a significant role.[176] However, their approaches somewhat
varied.
Because of the increased objectivity, fairness and quality that the PERA law will
bring to performance evaluations, PC and AFA proposed that a clear tie between
performance and acquiring tenure not begin in a school district until it first
implemented PERA.[177] Their major differences came over the length of the
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probationary period in which a teacher would need to attain positive (proficient or
excellent) evaluations to acquire tenure, the number of such evaluations required,
whether acquisition of tenure could be accelerated (less than four years) based on
consecutive positive evaluations, and whether tenure attained in one school
district could be used to shorten the time needed to acquire tenure in a new district
if a teacher moved (tenure portability), a concept that the unions had been
unsuccessfully working on legislatively for many years.[178]
PC and the School Management Alliance proposed an unlimited probationary
period in which a teacher could accrue four consecutive school terms of positive
evaluations.[179] The unions were notably troubled by this proposal, as school
districts could keep teachers in a perpetual probationary period by continuing to
give a needs improvement[180] evaluation to a teacher or just breaking a string of
positive evaluations with a negative one. AFA proposed retaining the four
consecutive school term probationary period in which a teacher would acquire
tenure if she received three positive evaluations during that time. As the
discussions evolved, the parties focused on their shared recognition that they
wanted to provide new teachers with the time needed to improve their skills
without penalizing them for taking a year or two to become proficient. As a result,
SB 7 maintains a four year probationary period, but requires that the teacher
receive a proficient or better evaluation in the second or third year, and a proficient
or better evaluation in the fourth year, to be eligible to receive tenure.[181] This
provides a teacher with a fair opportunity to improve skills, clearly ties
performance to acquiring tenure and does not permit a school district to continue
a teacher in an ongoing probationary period. If a teacher does not meet the
requirements for tenure at the end of the four-year probationary period, the school
district must fire her.[182]
When it came to accelerated tenure, PC proposed providing it to teachers who
received three consecutive excellent evaluations, AFA proposed providing it for
three consecutive proficient or excellent evaluations and the School Management
Alliance did not propose it at all, although it was open to the concept.[183] SB 7
provides for accelerated tenure, after PERA is implemented, for three consecutive
excellent evaluations then reemployment for the next school term.[184]
As for tenure portability, AFA proposed that a tenured teacher who left one district
and was employed by another would be able to acquire tenure in the second district
after receiving proficient or better evaluations in the first two years, while PC and
the School Management Alliance did not propose it at all.[185] SB 7 provides for
tenure portability, after PERA has been implemented, for two consecutive
excellent evaluations in the teacher’s first two years in the new school district. The
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teacher’s prior two evaluations in the former district must be proficient or better
PERA-evaluations, and she must have voluntarily left or been laid off from that
district.[186] On both of these issues, while not what the unions had proposed, SB
7 establishes concepts for which they had worked many years.
Two other issues proposed by the unions ended up going nowhere. First, they
proposed that if a teacher received an excellent evaluation, a school district had to
renew (re-employ) her for the subsequent school term. Their rationale was: What
non-arbitrary, performance-based reason could lead a district to nonrenew a
teacher who had received an excellent evaluation? If performance truly counts,
how could that decision be in the best interests of the students? Second, the unions
proposed that if a teacher received a proficient evaluation, a school district would
have to provide specific written reasons for nonrenewing her for the next school
term, no matter where she was in her probationary period.[187] Their rationale
was again: If performance truly counts, why shouldn’t a teacher who the district
has evaluated as proficient be at least provided the reasons why she was not being
re-employed? The objection to both of these proposals was that they infringed on
a school district’s authority to decide, for whatever reason other than one which
was discriminatory or in violation of the state or federal constitution, whether to
continue employing a teacher prior to acquiring tenure, at which point the district
would need cause to terminate. Unfortunately, because of the longstanding
legislative and judicial acceptance of this principle and the number and
prioritization of other matters, SB 7 made no changes on these two issues.
VI. CONCLUSION

As I hope this article shows, quality public policy does not occur overnight. It is a
process which takes leadership, time, dedication, knowledge, experience, openness
to ideas and an ability to find common ground. Coming out of such a process, SB
7 and other recent education reform legislation have provided public education in
the state with powerful tools. While they are not perfect,[188] if used with fidelity
to the high quality work and relationships, intent and purpose from which they
were forged, these tools will break meaningful ground. It will not be easy,
particularly in light of the serious financial stress on the state, school districts,
employees and families. But we must do it together: unions, management, elected
officials, parents, students and communities. And we must bring our best to the
effort. Anything less is a disservice to the children of the state and those who strive
to help them succeed.
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Chicago region’s leading institutions and is dedicated to improving Chicago as a
place to live, work, and conduct business”). The Illinois Chamber of Commerce
would also join this coalition.
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of their respective unions, Montgomery becoming IFT President in October 2010
and Lewis becoming CTU President in July 2010.
[67] Andrew Thomason, Teachers Unions on Reform: Slow Down, Illinois
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[68] See Press Release, Ill. Fed’n of Teachers, Ill. Educ. Ass’n and Chi. Teachers
Union, Accountability for All: A New Way Forward for Illinois Students (Jan 3.
2012) (http://www.ift-aft.org/Libraries/Documents/IEAIFTCTUSUMMARY-FIN
AL_1.sflb.ashx); see also Press Release, Ill. Fed’n of Teachers, Ill. Educ. Ass’n and
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01-03/Educators_Will_Propose_Accountability_For_All_Education_Reform_L
egislation.aspx.
[69] Both AFA and PC also proposed that, beginning with the 2012-2013 school
year, every school annually administer to staff, students and parents, a survey on
the instructional environment within the school. For a comparison of PC, AFA and
the Illinois School Management Proposal, see Ill. Ass’n of School Bus.
Officials, Analysis and Comparison of Education Reform Proposals, 1 (Jan. 21,
2011), http://www.iasbo.org/files/public/1_Analysis%20and%20Comparison%2
0ofEducation%20Reform%20Proposals%20-1.20.11.pdf.
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2011, available athttp://www.substancenews.net/articles.php?page=1946; IEA,
IFT and CTU Offer an Alternative to Reform Bill, Fred Klonsky (Jan 3,
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8, at 11.
[72] See Regenstein, supra note 8, at 12.
[73] At the first meeting on Jan. 27, 2011, over 60 people attended. Sen. Lightford
realized that meaningful discussions could not occur in such a large group. She set
a limit on how many representatives each group could have at subsequent
meetings. Groups regularly represented at the meetings included: ISBE; AFA
Coalition of the 3 unions (IEA, IFT and CTU); PC coalition of Stand for Children,
Advance Illinois, Illinois Business Roundtable, Civic Committee of the Commercial
Club of Chicago and Illinois Chamber of Commerce; school management (IASB,
IASA, IPA, IASBO, CPAA (Chicago Principals and Administrators Association);
LUDA (Large Urban District Association – advocacy group for the largest 53 unit
school districts in Illinois); EDRED (Education Research Development – advocacy
group for suburban Chicago School districts); SCOPE (South Cooperative
Organization for Public Education — grassroots local organization focusing on the
needs of school districts in south and southwest suburban Cook and Will
Counties); Chicago Public Schools; Parent PAC (advocacy group for public school
parents). In addition, the other Senators on the committee and several House
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members, i.e., Reps. Eddy and Representative Chapa La Via, representatives from
the Governor’s Office, including Deputy Chief of Staff Julie Smith, attended some
if not most of the meetings. See id.
[74] Issues which were specific to education and labor relations in the Chicago
Public Schools were most often worked on by representatives from CPS, including
Rachel Resnick, CPS Chief Labor Relations Officer, Joe Moriarty, CPS Deputy
General Counsel, and CPS outside counsel Stephanie Donovan and Jim Franczek
of Franczek & Radelet; representatives from CTU, including Karen Lewis, CTU
President, and CTU outside counsel Robert Bloch of Dowd, Bloch & Bennett and
Mike Persoon of Despres, Schwartz & Geoghegan, and from time to time
representatives from the CPAA, including Executive Director Clarice Berry. See
id. at 13.
[75] The school report card is a document that is produced for each regular public
school in compliance with Section 10-17a of the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS
5/10-17a. It includes information such as how students in every Illinois school
district and each district school have performed on state assessments, student
demographics, staffing, teacher demographics, etc. Thanks to legislation
sponsored by both Sen. Lightford and Rep. Chapa La Via, beginning with the 20132014 school year, new school report cards will be used. More information on the
new report cards is available at Ill. Gov’t News Network, Governor Quinn Signs
Law to Overhaul School Performance Reporting, http://www.illinois.gov/Press
Releases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=9985.
[76] “See Sen. Kimberly Lightford, Comments on Education Reform and Collective
Bargaining, Ill. Statehouse News, Apr. 6, 2011, available at http://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=PCl3COtZu98&feature=plcp&context=C4987cabVDvjVQa1PpcF
PTsbp3lTQ4yIIwiFFAK1vIi6m3OsOO5go%3D (“For me, (it’s about) what’s best
for the student and the classroom. If we’re all focused on getting the best results
for the students, I’m pretty sure we can come up as education stakeholders and
adults and professionals in the room with the process in which to get there”).
[77] See Ill. Senate Democrats, Sen. Lightford’s Biography, http://www.senate
dem.ilga.gov/index. php/about-me-lightford.
[78] See Regenstein, supra note 8, at 15. (Sen. Lightford also kept a close watch on
how each group communicated with its members. When a group was caught
encouraging its members to advance its own positions by lobbying legislators
outside of the process or mischaracterizing ongoing discussions, she quickly and
effectively addressed the matter in no uncertain terms.).

SPRING 2012

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

51

[79] See Stephanie Banchero, Illinois Attempts to Link Teacher Tenure to Results,
The Wall St. Journal, Jan. 4, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
1000142405274870411150457 6060122295287678.html; Doug Finke, Illinois
House Committee to Take on Education Reform Proposals, The State JournalRegister, Dec. 11, 2010, available at http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x1757
257545/Illinois-House-committee-to-take-on-education-reform-proposals.
[80] From IEA’s perspective, the advocacy, work ethic and professionalism of in
particular ISBE General Counsel Reisberg, IASA General Counsel Boucek and
former ISBE General Counsel Furr, who was representing PC, were of the highest
order. This does not mean that relationships between others were not at times
strained. While IEA had developed a good relationship with Advance Illinois over
the years, when Advance Illinois partnered with SFC, a group with which IEA had
no relationship and who had not shown in other states a desire to work with
teachers’ unions, the IEA-Advance Illinois relationship was hurt. The two groups,
for the most part, worked through the problem. See Regenstein, supra note 8, at
14.
[81] Cheryl Burton, Illinois Senate Passes Education Reform Bill, ABC News (Apr.
14, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local/illinois&id=807
3470; see Montgomery, supra note 13; Ill. Ass’n of School Adm’rs, IASA Supports
Landmark Education Reform Package 1 (April 15, 2011), http://dime
141.dizinc.com/~iasa/images/stories/Press%20Release%20042511%20Educatio
n%20Reform.pdf; Stand for Children, Major Changes to Illinois Schools on
Horizon with Senate Bill 7, http://performancecounts.org/our-update/majorchanges-illinois-schools-horizon-introduction-senate-bill-7 ) (The legislation was
actually passed twice, once as Senate Bill 7 and once as Senate Bill 630, because of
a concern that SB 7 was not procedurally ready to be voted on by the full Senate.
All the parties who participated in the months-long negotiations publicly
supported the legislation.)
[82] The House had initially shown the greatest interest in PC as it was originally
drafted. Furthermore, during early 2011, while the Senate Committee was doing its
work, there were continued rumblings from the House that they were getting
impatient and would move PC or some legislation significantly based upon it if the
Senate didn’t get something done. Chris Wetterich, House Committee Approves
Education Reform Bill: Changes Needed, The State Journal-Registrar, May 11,
2011 available at http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x1058160665/House-comm it
tee-approves-education-reform-bill.
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[83] The final Senate committee meeting occurred in the late afternoon and
evening of Tuesday, April 12, 2011, at which changes to the IELRA were
resolved. After several hours of negotiations, it was left to the core group of
attorneys and a few others to finalize language. The most complex issues involved
the relationship between CPS and CTU; in particular, Section 4.5 and 12(b) of the
IELRA, and the CTU’s right to strike. Unfortunately, CPS representatives, who had
been involved in the drafting of the language from which the core group worked,
could not stay to draft the final language. The core group was therefore unaware
that language dealing with the jurisdiction of the IELRB and other third-parties
addressed an issue which was in litigation at the time. See Chicago Teachers
Union and Chicago Board of Education, No. 2011-CA-0033-C (IELRB 2011). In
addition, a dispute developed about the language dealing with the membership
vote which CTU would need in order to strike. These issues led the CTU Executive
Board and House of Delegates, in early May 2011, to reverse its position of support
for the legislation. See Press Release, Chi. Teacher’s Union, Chicago Teachers
Union Governing Body Supports Changes to SB7 (May 5, 2011) (http://www.ct
unet.com/blog/press-release-chicago-teachers-union-governing-body-supports-c
hanges-to-sb7).
[84] See Ill. Gen. Assembly, Bill Status of SB0007, http://www.ilga.gov/
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=7&GAID=11&DocTypeID=SB&LegId=53964
&SessionID=84&GA=97 It passed the Senate 54-0 and the House 112-1-1.
[85] See Ill. Gen. Assembly, Bill Status of HB1197, http://www.ilga.gov/
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=1197&GAID=11&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=5
7145&SessionID=84&GA=97. HB 1197 is what is commonly referred to as a “trailer
bill,” which typically makes clarifications or corrections to another bill recently
passed by the General Assembly. It passed the Senate 51-5 and the House 116-0.
[86] The time between the passage of SB 7 and HB 1197 was tense for the
unions. At the time SB 7 was passed on May 12, it was still unclear whether CPS
and CTU would be able to reach a resolution on their issues and then whether a
trailer bill would be passed. This uncertainty led all three unions to change their
positions of support for SB 7 to either neutral (IEA) or opposition (IFT and
CTU). See Kristen McQueary, Education Bill Moves On Despite Objections, Chi.
News Cooperative, May 11, 2011, available at:http://www.chicagonewscoop.org/
education-bill-moves-on-despite-objections/. The unions were prepared to ask
the Governor to step in. However, due to the skills of and relationship between
Jim Franczek, CPS outside attorney, and Robert Bloch, CTU outside attorney, and
the support of newly-elected Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel and CTU President
Karen Lewis, a resolution was reached. See Regenstein, supra note 8, at 18. For a
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fuller discussion of the CPS-CTU negotiations, see James Franczek & Amy
Dickerson, Education Reform in Illinois: Making Performance Count, 29 Illinois
Public Employee Relations Report, Winter 2012, at 1.
[87] HB 1197 became P.A. 97-007, available at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/
publicacts/97/PDF/097-0007.pdf; and SB 7 became P.A. 97-008, available
at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/97/PDF/097-0008.pdf.
[88] For a synopsis of all those changes made by SB 7, see Appendix A. For an
excellent guidance document produced by ISBE on many SB 7 and PERA issues,
see note 41, supra.
[89] Also called “honorable dismissals” to distinguish them from dismissals for
cause due to misconduct or unsatisfactory performance, and decisions not to
renew the employment of non-tenured teachers.
[90] Illinois School Code § 24-12, 105 ILCS 5/24-12. A different procedure applied
in CPS. See Illinois School Code § 34-18.31, 105 ILCS 5/34-18.31.
[91] See Schafer v. Bd. of Educ. of Arlington Heights School Dist. No. 25, 157
Ill.App.3d 884, 510 N.E.2d 1186 (1st Dist. 1987) (alternative method of
determining the sequence of layoffs must “bear the same characteristics as inverse
seniority; must “be founded upon objectively-verifiable criteria unrelated to a
teacher’s skills, abilities, or performance”).
[92] Matthew Di Carlo, A Quality-Based Look at Seniority-Based Layoffs,
Shanker Blog, Feb. 4, 2011, available athttp://shankerblog.org/?p=1791.
[93] Id.
[94] See Jonah Rockoff, The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student
Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data, March 2003, http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe
/papers/0304/0304002.pdf; Matthew Di Carlo, The Teaching Experience,
Shanker Blog, Nov. 18, 2010, available at http://shankerblog.org/?p=1319. But
see The New Teacher Project, The Case Against Quality-Blind Teacher Layoffs,
Feb. 2011, available at: http://tntp.org/assets/documents/TNTP_Case_Against
_Quality_Blind_Layoffs_Feb2011.pdf?files/TNTP_Case_Against_Quality_Blind
_Layoffs_Feb2011.pdf.
[95] See Ill. Ass’n of School Adm’rs, Performance Counts Act of 2010 – Draft
Legislation, 1 (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.iasaedu.org/images/stories/Per for
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mance%20Counts%20Act%20of%202010_final(1).pdf. It was unclear what
factors other than those listed could be used in determining performance.
[96] See Press Release, Ill. Fed’n of Teachers, Ill. Educ. Ass’n and Chi. Teachers
Union, Accountability for All: A New Way Forward for Illinois Students (Jan 3.
2012)
(http://www.ift-aft.org/Libraries/Documents/IEAIFTCTUSUMMARYFINAL_1.sflb.ashx); seealso Press Release, Ill. Fed’n of Teachers, Ill. Educ. Ass’n
and Chi. Teachers Union, Educators Will Proposed ‘Accountability for All’
Education Reform Legislation (Jan. 3, 2012) (http://www.ift-aft.org/news/p
ressreleases/11-01-03/Educators_Will_Propose_AccountabilityFor_All_Educa
tion_Reform_Legislation.aspx.
[97] See Dillon, supra note 51.
[98] As mentioned earlier, see note 47, supra, PERA created an advisory
committee, PEAC, which was charged with recommending to ISBE minimum
standards for all new evaluation plans and the content of the State model, to which
districts would default if they couldn’t through their joint PERA committees reach
agreement. While at the time of the SB 7 negotiations PEAC had not yet made any
recommendations on what tests and other assessments might be used to measure
student growth and teacher classroom performance, its discussions were going
toward the likely creation of several groups of assessments from which a district
and its teachers could select and more rigorous objective requirements on what
evaluators would need to support their observations of teachers.
[99] Regenstein, supra note 8, at 16.
[100] For each type of teaching position, state law establishes the state-issued
teaching certificate and additional qualifications, such as endorsements and
coursework, that a teacher must have. These qualifications are called “legal
qualifications,” and have been used in layoffs to determine what positions a teacher
is qualified to hold. PC and school management wanted districts which, for
example, had, a significant number of ESL (English as a Second Language)
students, to be able to add ESL coursework or endorsement as an additional
qualification for holding a position. More information on certification and legal
qualifications from ISBE is available at http://www.isbe.state.il.us/certi
fication/requirements/toc.htm.
[101] See Illinois School Code § 24-12(b), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(b). Teachers in the
lowest performance group are laid off first and at the discretion of the
district. Teachers in the second lowest performance group are further grouped by
the average of their last two evaluations and then sorted by seniority within those
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subgroups. Teachers in the two highest performance groups are sorted by
seniority, with teachers in the highest group the least vulnerable to layoff. If a
school district fails to evaluate a teacher, who has already received at least one
evaluation, in a year in which such an evaluation is due, then the teacher will be
deemed to have received a proficient evaluation for RIF-grouping purposes.
See id § 24-12(d), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d).
[102] See Illinois School Code § 24-12(c), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(c). This joint
committee is similar to the PERA joint committee, see notes 46 – 47, supra, and
accompanying text, except that its decisions are made by majority vote while the
PERA committee’s decisions are made by consensus. Every school district was
required to hold the first meeting of its joint committee no later than Dec. 1, 2011.
[103] The law provides that if the joint committee agrees to modify the criteria, a
school district is bound by that agreement, unless the joint committee agrees to
change it. See Illinois School Code § 24-12(c), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(c). Even after the
first year of a joint committee’s existence, it is important for that committee to
continue to meet annually to assess whether group criteria need to be modified.
[104] This will likely be an annual responsibility of the joint committee, providing
an additional reason why the committee should continue to meet every year.
[105] See PERA/SB 7 Guidance, supra note 41, at FAQ E-42 and E-43. See also
Hancon v. Bd. of Educ. of Barrington Community Unit School Dist. No. 220, 130
Ill.App.3d 224, 474 N.E.2d 407 (2d Dist. 1985).
[106] To agree to this the unions required that any additional qualifications be 1)
clearly established and formalized so that they applied to all rather than some
teachers teaching in a particular position and 2) known far enough in advance so
teachers would have the ability to meet them in time to remain qualified. Thus,
the job description and May 10th requirements are in the law.
[107] Even though these districts are not required to begin using the new layoff
criteria and procedures until their collective bargaining agreements expire, they
are still required to hold the first meeting of their joint committees by Dec. 1, 2011.
Illinois School Code § 24-12(c), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(c).
[108] More information about this program, developed for IASA by Dr. Don White,
Superintendent, Troy Community Consolidated School District 30-C, is available
at http://www.iasasurveys.org.
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[109] SB 7 specifically provides, “A teacher’s grouping and ranking on a sequence
of honorable dismissal shall be deemed a part of the teacher’s performance
evaluation, and that information may be disclosed to the exclusive bargaining
representative as part of a sequence of dismissal list, notwithstanding laws
prohibiting disclosure of such information.” Illinois School Code § 24-12(b), 105
ILCS 5/24-12(b). The laws which prohibit the disclosure of teacher evaluations are
Section 24A-7.1 of the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/24A-7.1 (“Except as otherwise
provided under this Act, disclosure of public school teacher, principal, and
superintendent performance evaluations is prohibited”) and Section 11 of the
Personnel Records Review Act, 820 ILCS 40/11 (“This Act shall not be construed
to diminish a right of access to records already other provided by law, provided
that disclosure of performance evaluations under the Freedom of Information Act
shall be prohibited”).
[110] See Piquard v. Board of Education of Pekin Community High School District
No. 303, 242 Ill.App.3d 477, 610 N.E.2d 757 (3d Dist. 1993).
[111] PERA/SB 7 Guidance, supra note 41.
[112] See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
[113] Performance Counts, Put Student Well-Being at the Center of Contract
Negotiations, Dec. 2010, available at http://performancecounts.org/sites/defau
lt/files/page-down loads/student-well-being.pdf. However, the very testimony of
Eden Martin, at the time President of the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club
of Chicago, one of the organizations in PC, belies this characterization. In his
testimony to the Special House Committee on Education Reform in December
2010, Mr. Martin characterized strikes as a “thermonuclear bomb,” admitting that
“In the end…the [PC] proposal is designed to preclude a strike.” See http://www.
ift-aft.org/qualityeducationreform/HearingUpdate 1217.aspx.
[114] Professor Gerald Berendt, Written Testimony presented to the Special House
Committee on Education Reform, December 2010 (copy on file with author).
Professor Berendt, former chairman of the IELRB, testified on the proposed
amendments to the IELRA as follows:
The proposed amendments do more than restrict the right of educational
employees and their labor organizations to strike legally. The amendments would
effectively eliminate the legal strike except in the most unusual situations. Educational employers, would soon learn to play the new system, with the
fact-finding process quickly becoming a perfunctory exercise, a mere hurdle to the
end game provided in proposed Section 12(c)(7). Instead of encouraging good
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faith bargaining, the new process would encourage surface bargaining and reward
bad faith. Educational employers would go through the motions of bargaining,
exhaust the fact-finding steps and then impose terms on the bargaining unit.
The narrowing and virtual elimination of the legal right to strike may not be the
most dramatic effect of these proposed amendments. Without a legal right to
strike, public education labor relations will predictably revert to the conditions
which led to the passage of the IELRA in the first place. Those of us who
experienced those conditions understand that this will lead to the disappearance
of the collaborative collective bargaining process we have enjoyed for the many
years since the Educational Labor Relations Act went into effect in
1984. Restricting or eliminating the legal right to strike and permitting
educational employers to impose terms will neither promote constructive
collective bargaining, nor reduce the number of strikes.
I am confident that the amendments to the Educational Labor Relations Act would
actually increase the number of public teacher strikes in Illinois. The strikes would
be illegal under the amended IELRA and striking teachers and their unions would
risk the consequences provided in the amendments. However, these penalties
would no more deter such strikes than the more serious penalties, including
incarceration, deterred pre-Act strikes in Illinois or elsewhere, such as in Detroit.
Why, you may ask, would teachers be more likely to strike under the amended
Act? The amended Act would so skew the bargaining ratio in favor of educational
employers, free to impose terms unilaterally, that unions would be forced to strike,
albeit illegally, in order to level the playing field. Unions would have to strike to
get management to take their bargaining proposals seriously. Put simply,
collaborative, bilateral determination of wages, hours and terms of conditions of
employment is not possible without a credible provision for resort to self-help.
Eliminating the legal right to strike actually increases the reasons for unions to
strike. Under the present law, unions strike principally in order to extract
concessions in bargaining. If these amendments pass, unions will additionally feel
the need to strike in order to bring the employer to the table in a meaningful
way. In effect, unions will be compelled to reestablish their credibility as effective
bargaining agents for the employees they are privileged to represent. There will be
many, many more strikes in the nature of recognition strikes. Comparison of the
pre-IERA strike statistics with the post- Act strike statistics clearly and
overwhelmingly establishes this.
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Finally, if teachers are essential public employees in the same category as police
and firefighters, why not substitute interest arbitration for the right to strike? This
would be a more effective device for reducing or eliminating the public education
strike because such systems encourage good faith bargaining and do not permit
the employer to impose terms unilaterally. However, it appears that the true
purpose of the amendments is not to reduce the number of teacher strikes, which
have been much fewer since the right to strike was recognized in 1984. The
proponents’ true purpose is apparently to diminish the collective bargaining right
and process, seeking to return to “the good old days” when educational employers
either had no unions representing their employees or, if they did, could ignore
them. And as I have already laid out, such a return to the pre-Act conditions will
only lead to more strikes and undermine the collaborative collective bargaining
process that has served the best interests of all concerned for the past quarter
century. The bitterness of such strikes lasts long after they end and pollute the
labor management atmosphere in a manner that cannot help but damage the
delivery of educational services to students.
Professor Berendt’s testimony was extremely helpful in assisting the committee’s
understanding of the effect of the PC proposals.
[115] Even in the face of data which clearly showed that strikes had dramatically
decreased over the years, PC and others, including several legislators, alleged that
that data was essentially irrelevant. They claimed that just the threat that a union
could strike so scared school districts that they readily agreed to union bargaining
demands which hurt their districts. Unions used the threat to their advantage and
to the disadvantage of districts and students. As SFC Executive Director Jonah
Edelman stated, “Because of the imbalance in the current way contracts are
negotiated, the threat of a strike has been unfortunately used as a trump card to
prevent key educational issues from being discussed and progress being made, and
the most prominent case in point is student learning time.” Agreement Close on
Education Reform, LINCOLN DAILY News, April 7, 2011, available a thttp://arc hiv
es.lincolndailynews.com/2011/Apr/07/News/today040711_e.shtml. Of course,
no empirical data was presented to support this position. Nor could they answer
why, if the strike threat forced districts to agree to bargaining demands not in their
best interest, a significant number of unions had agreed, for example, to salary
and/or benefit freezes/cut backs, in recent bargaining. See Illinois State Board of
Education, Illinois Teacher Salary Study 2012-2011, April 2011, at Table 3,
available at http://www.isbe.net/research/pdfs/teacher_salary_10-11.pdf.
[116] See Agreement Close on Education Reform, Illinois Statehouse News, April
6, 2011, available at http://www.foxillinois.com/news/top-stories/Agreement-
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close-on-education-reform-119353709.html. In depth discussion of possible
IELRA changes first occurred at the committee meeting on April 7, 2011, just one
week before any legislation had to be passed by the Senate, as it had an April 15
deadline.
[117] Mayor-elect Rahm Emanuel had made increasing the length of the CPS
school day a top priority. And with the CPS-CTU collective bargaining agreement
expiring in 2012, he was concerned about the possibility of a strike, even though
CTU had not gone out on strike since 1987. See Regine Schlesinger, Teachers
Union President: Strike is Possible, WBBM Radio, June 16, 2011, available
at http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/06/16/teachers-union-president-strike-ispossible/.
[118] Performance Counts, supra note 113.
[119] The School Management Alliance was also wary of such a proposal.
[120] The unions found particular support for their belief in the work of Professor
Martin Malin on the negative consequences to the bargaining process of mandated
fact-finding, first published in 1993, Public Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and
Experience, 26 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 313 (1993). Professor Malin also provided the
following email, dated April 11, 2011, to Mitchell Roth, which the unions shared
with those involved in the negotiations:
Thank you for sharing with me the proposals to amend the Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Act and for soliciting my input. I am deeply troubled by the
proposals that would require or allow one party to require factfinding and rejection
of the factfinder’s award as a prerequisite to a lawful strike. Requiring pre-strike
factfinding is a poor policy choice.
I performed what I believe is the only major empirical study of the use of pre-strike
factfinding in the public sector. The study was published as, “Public Employees’
Right to Strike: Law and Experience,” 26 University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform 313 (1993). Here is a link to the study. http://works.bepress.com/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=martin_malin. The empirical analysis
of pre-strike factfinding is found at pages 379-395. I found that strikes which occur
after mandated pre-strike factfinding are harder to settle and last significantly
longer than strikes which occur without mandated pre-strike factfinding. First, I
compared the duration of strikes in Illinois and Ohio. Both states lawfully
recognized a right to strike for their public employees in 1984. Ohio mandated prestrike factfinding and rejection of the factfinder’s recommendations for a strike to
be lawful. Illinois mandated mediation but not factfinding. I found that most
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strikes in Illinois settled within 10 days and Illinois strikes rarely lasted longer than
30 days. In contrast, most strikes in Ohio went longer than 10 days and a
significant minority lasted longer than 30 days. Overall, the differences in strike
duration were significant at the .01 confidence level, i.e., they were 99% likely not
to have occurred by chance.
I followed up with further analysis of the Ohio data. In Ohio, parties could agree
on a mutually agreed-on dispute resolution procedure (known by the acronym
MAD) and the MADs generally did away with the factfinding step. So, I compared
the duration of strikes in Ohio under the statutory procedure to the duration of
strikes in Ohio under MADs without factfinding and found again that the strikes
following factfinding were lengthier than the strikes under MADs. The differences
in strike duration were significant at the 0.025 confidence level, that is they were
97.50% likely not to have occurred by chance.
I then looked at Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania law at the time, the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board had the discretion to impose factfinding as a
prerequisite to a lawful strike. The PLRB’s practice was to only impose factfinding
where the mediator or the parties suggested that it could help. In other words, the
PLRB practice provided a built-in selection bias in the data favoring
factfinding. Despite this, the data showed again that strikes following pre-strike
factfinding were longer than strikes without pre-strike factfinding. The results
were significant at the .05 confidence level, i.e., they were 95% likely not to have
occurred by chance.
I was not surprised that strikes following factfinding are harder to settle and last
longer than strikes without factfinding. Factfinding and rejection by one party of
the factfinder’s recommendations further polarizes the parties and further hardens
positions. The process is an adjudicatory one which means it is an adversarial
proceeding. One party has indicated its willingness to accept the factfinder’s
recommendations while the other party has rejected them and all of this has been
made public. The party that was willing to accept the recommendations will
understandably harden its position saying, “Why should I make any more
movement. I am willing to accept what the neutral said was reasonable even
though I don’t agree with it. The other side is being unreasonable. I won’t make a
move.” The fact that all of this happens in public makes it that much more difficult
to get the party that was willing to accept the factfinder’s recommendations to
move. Moreover, the party that rejected the recommendation has its rejection
made public and it too will be more resistant to movement lest it look to the public
that it is admitting that its rejection was unreasonable or otherwise a mistake. It
is a mediator’s nightmare.
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Factfinding can reduce the incidence of strikes but the data from Ohio showed that
this occurred primarily because the parties failed to reject the recommendations in
time. (The Ohio statute required a vote by 60% of the union membership or 60%
of the employer’s governing body to reject; otherwise, the recommendations were
deemed accepted. The bill recently signed by the Ohio Governor reduces this to
50% but that bill may be stayed by the referendum effort currently ongoing in
Ohio.) In such cases, factfinding functions like interest arbitration. But a major
drawback of interest arbitration is its inherently conservative nature. Interest
arbitrators place a heavy burden on any party that wants to change the status
quo. Consequently, negotiating for innovative approaches under an interest
arbitration regime is much more difficult than negotiating for innovative
approaches under a right-to-strike regime. A study published last year by Tom
Kochan of MIT is the latest confirmation of this. Consequently, I concluded in my
1993 study:
“Reliance on mandatory pre-strike factfinding to reduce strikes is a policy that is
damned if it works and damned if it fails. To the extent that it succeeds in
preventing strikes, it functions considerably like interest arbitration. As with
interest arbitration, strikes are prevented at a cost of innovation and problem
solving in bargaining. When it fails, it introduces new issues into the bargaining
process, hardens attitudes and makes compromises more difficult. Although many
factors may contribute to the duration of a particular strike, requiring prestrike
factfinding increases the likelihood of longer strikes. Thus, mandating prestrike
factfinding does not appear to be a sound policy.”
Although my study is 18 years old, I have not seen any developments in the past
two decades that would lead me to believe that my conclusions no longer
hold. Moreover, I have particular concerns with introducing a pre-strike
factfinding mandate in Illinois.
The Illinois experience has been very positive. My study found that the incidence
of strikes actually declined after they were legalized. The legalization of public
employee strikes certainly did not result in an increase of strike activity even
though there was a large increase in public employee collective bargaining. In the
current recession, strikes are almost non-existent.
Last fall, I presented a seminar for State of Illinois attorneys cosponsored by the
Governor’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office. At that time, I reviewed the
recent strike data. In 2008-09, there was only 1 strike in public education and it
lasted 1 day. There were only 11 strike notices. In 2009-10, there were only 4
strikes but one was at U of I. So, in K-12 education, there were 3 strikes and only
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13 strike notices. The 3 strikes lasted 4, 16 and 3 days. In 2010-11, as of the date
of my presentation, there had been 2 strikes (2 days and 3 days) and 10 strike
notices. In other words, since the recession hit, there have been only 6 strikes in
K-12 education in this state and all but one were settled in less than a week.
The experience noted above is understandable. Unlike the private sector where a
strike may shut an employer down and interrupt its revenue stream, when public
employees strike, their employers continue to collect taxes. In K-12 education, as
long as enough strike days are made up to meet the 180-day school year, the school
district suffers no reduction in state aid and the strikers, of course, suffer no loss
of income to the extent that strike days are made up. Thus, unlike the private
sector strike whose effects and pressure are primarily economic, the public sector
strike’s effect and pressure are primarily political. I think it is clear that public
employee unions correctly recognize that a strike in the current environment
would generate political backlash against the union rather than political pressure
against the employer. Unions have little if any bargaining leverage from a strike
threat today and they realize it, as reflected in not only the very small number of
strikes but also the very small number of strike notices.
I fear that mandating pre-strike factfinding could tempt some unions to try to get
favorable factfinding recommendations which they can use for leverage in the
bargaining process. They may succeed or they may not but they will turn a
negotiation process into an adversarial adjudicatory proceeding or will use the
threat of doing so in an effort to replace the leverage that their strike threat no
longer carries. In these challenging fiscal environments that our school districts
face, we don’t need to inject the ability to engage in such gamesmanship to distract
the parties from a cooperative mutual problem-solving approach to collective
negotiations. In Illinois, we have, over the years, discouraged such game
playing. For example, when the IERLA was first enacted, unions and school
districts played games with the mediation process. When one party had greater
resources than the other, it had a tendency to refuse to join the other party in a
request to FMCS to mediate forcing the matter to a private mediator and imposing
on the party with the weaker resources the burden of paying one-half of the
mediator’s fee. Fortunately, in the mid-1980s, we amended the IELRA to provide
that if a party refuses to join the other party’s request for FMCS to mediate, the
refusing party must pay the entire fee of the private mediator. That ended those
games. Why should we now inject factfinding and start the game playing all over
again?
Over the years some have suggested that just having the right to strike distorts the
public sector collective bargaining process because the strike is so powerful a
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weapon. This view received prominence in the classic book by Wellington and
Winter, The Unions and the Cities, published by the Brookings Institution in
1971. This view has only existed in theory – it has become a bit of an urban
myth. Experience tells us that public officials do not roll over and cave in to union
demands backed by threat of strike. As I noted above, in the current environment,
unions appear to recognize that strike threats are hollow – they are not even taking
the ministerial step of filing strike notices to any significant degree.
I am also concerned that the neutrals in Illinois have little to no experience with
factfinding. A factfinder has to negotiate a delicate balance between two
conflicting roles. On the one hand, a goal of factfinding is to lead to settlement. In
this regard, a factfinder is looking for a recommendation that both parties are likely
to find acceptable. On the other hand, if there is no settlement, the
recommendation will be made public and in this regard the factfinder needs to
present a completely objective analysis much like an interest arbitrator. I suspect
we will have a bit of a learning curve for most neutrals who practice in Illinois in
adjusting to this conflicted role.
My comments are based on my 3 decades of experience teaching, researching and
writing about public sector labor relations and labor law as well as my experience
as a participant in public sector labor relations as a neutral and as a consultant. I
served as a consultant to the Illinois public sector labor boards when the statutes
first took effect and drafted their regulations implementing the statutes. I have
mediated and arbitrated numerous disputes in the public sector in Illinois and
elsewhere and have served as a reporter to the Association of Labor Relations
Agencies, the organization of labor boards and mediation agencies at the federal,
state, provincial and local levels in the United States and Canada. My book, Public
Sector Employment: Cases and Materials (West 2004, 2nd ed. 2011) is the primary
law school casebook on public sector labor law. I currently serve, by appointment
of President Obama, as a Member of the Federal Service Impasses Panel, which
resolves impasses in collective bargaining between federal agencies and the unions
that represent those agencies’ employees.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide input. Feel free to share my comments
with others involved in the legislative discussions.
Professor Malin’s statement was critical to the resolution of this issue.
[121] Such school districts include all charter schools, whether in Chicago or
elsewhere. Charter schools explicitly fall within the Section 2(a) definition of
“educational employer” or “employer” for purposes of Sections 12(a), (c) and (d) of
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the IELRA and within the scope of the Section 2(a) of the IELRA term “public
school district” for purposes of Section 12(a-5) of the IELRA. The only entity which
is exempted from Section 12(a-5) is a public school district organized under Article
34 of the School Code, i.e., CPS. And while charter schools fall within the term
“public school district,” charter schools in Chicago are not organized under Article
34; they are organized under Article 27A of the School Code.
[122] PC and the legislators believed that mandatory fact-finding needed to be
required in CPS. This belief was driven by the concern they had over the largescale community and school district disruption a strike could have, the complexity
of the issues in CPS, the history of CTU strikes (again even though one had not
occurred in almost 25 years) and the feared militancy of newly-elected CTU
President Karen Lewis. Additionally, these concerns where shared by newlyelected Mayor Emanuel, which undoubtedly played a major role.
[123] See IELRA § 12(a-5), 115 ILCS 5/12(a-5).
[124] 115 ILCS 5/2(a).
[125] Or. Rev. Stat. § 243.712.
[126] See IELRA § 13(a)(2), 115 ILCS 5/13(a)(2).
[127] 115 ILCS 5/12(a-5).
[128] In fact Section 12 of the IELRA is broadly entitled “Impasse procedures,” and
includes the word “impasse” several times in its text, e.g., the ability of either part
to initiate mediation within 45 days (changed to within 90 days under SB 7) if “the
parties engaged in collective bargaining have reached an ‘impasse’….” 115 ILCS
5/12. No one has ever successfully argued that use of the term “impasse” has meant
that the employer, at that point in time, could unilaterally implement its last
bargaining positions on unresolved issues.
[129] 4 PERI 1136 (IELRB 1988).
[130] Under Kewanee, the IELRB looks at the “totality of circumstances,”
including: bargaining history, the good faith of the parties, the length of
negotiations, the importance of the issues as to which there is no agreement, and
the contemporaneous understanding of the parties. Those involved in discussing
and drafting this subsection (a-5) never expressed the intention that use of these
terms was meant to change existing IELRB law.
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[131] The Oregon statute upon which subsection (a-5) was in significant part
modeled explicitly provides that an employer may not unilaterally implement all
or part of its posted final offer at least until the posting period has been
completed. Or. Rev. Stat. § 243.712 (2)(d).
[132] The time period for a party to petition the IELRB to initiate mediation was
changed from within 45 to within 90 days of the start of the school year, and the
time period for the IELRB to invoke mediation if the parties haven’t requested it
was changed from within 15 days to within 45 days of the start of the school
years. The parties can still stipulate, however, to defer mediation. 115 ILCS
5/12(a).
[133] While CTU is the primary union of CPS employees, the changes also apply to
other unions which represent CPS employees under the IELRA.
[134] For reasons why CPS and CTU were treated differently, see supra note 122.
[135] This requirement does not apply to either charter schools within Chicago,
which are covered under the public posting requirements of Section 12(a-5) of the
IELRA, or higher education institutions in Chicago. See 115 ILCS 5/12(a-10)(1).
[136] See supra note 62.
[137] See Section 12(a-10) of the IELRA, 115 ILCS 5/12(a-10). If the parties have
not reached agreement with 75 days after the fact-finding panel is appointed, the
panel will issue its report, including findings and recommendations, privately to
the parties. If within 15 days either party files notice with rationale rejecting the
panel’s report, the panel will make the report and the rejection public. The union
then has to wait 30 days until it can strike. See Section 13(a)(2.5), 115 ILCS
5/13(a)(2.5).
[138] See supra note 83. When originally drafted, SB 7 included language which
arguably would have required a 3/4ths vote of all bargaining unit members to
strike instead of bargaining unit members who are also members of the union.
[139] Some have speculated that the acceptance by the unions of these changes was
all part of PC’s plan to “drive a wedge” between the unions, leaving PC’s main
concern, CTU, vulnerable. See Michael Zucker, A Model for the Nation: How
Performance Counts Did the Impossible and Reformed Illinois Schools, December
2011, available at http://www.phoenixworks.org/PLSC260/ZuckerM.pdf:
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Edelman argues [in his presentation In June 2011 at the Aspen
Institute, see supra note 54] that the Performance Counts coalition drove a wedge
between the more ‘pragmatic’ IEA and the more radical IFT/CTU. When the issue
of collective bargaining arose, the Performance Counts coalition had several
fallback positions prepared from their original proposal, and decided to exploit the
split between the unions. Having demonstrated the capability to affect the
structure of collective bargaining – which Edelman called the ‘primary’ concern of
a union – the Performance Counts coalition brought the largely downstate-focused
IEA to its side by focusing solely on Chicago. With Karen Lewis, the head of CTU,
being urged by both the IEA and Lightford to take the deal, she caved – electing
the 75% threshold over binding arbitration – and thus producing the theoretical
right to strike.
Whether this was all part of PC’s plan, the unions will not speculate. If it was,
however, it was the antithesis of how those actually involved in the SB 7
negotiations, including those from PC (which except for one meeting, didn’t
include Mr. Edelman), acted. While differences certainly existed, the approach by
all was respectful, sincere, interest-based and collaborative. As a record of what
truly took place, it is pure fiction and promotional puffery, as subsequently
acknowledged by Mr. Edelman in an apology he sent to all involved. His apology
is available at http://www.ieanea.org/media/2011/07/Jonah-Edelman-emailedapology-6-10.pdf. No wedge was driven between the unions on this issue. Quite to
the contrary, all the unions worked closer together and in more common purpose
than they ever had before. Both the IEA and IFT supported whatever the CTU
believed was in its best interest.
[140] CTU believes that the 75% vote of all union members in the bargaining unit
is not an insurmountable hurdle. See, e.g., Sarah Karp, For the Record: Chicago
Teachers Union Strike Votes, Catalyst Chicago, July 11, 2011, available
at http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2011/07/11/record-chicago-teach
ers-union-strike-votes.
[141] 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a). For school districts in the remainder of the state, the
decision on the length of the school day is a mandatory subject of
bargaining. Heyworth School Dist. No. 3, 1 PERI 1182 (IELRB 1985).
[142] In fall 2011, the IELRB issued a complaint, for which it was prepared to seek
an injunction, against CPS for attempting to increase the length of the school day
at several schools. Chicago Bd. of Educ., Case No. 2012-CA-0009-C (Oct. 13, 2011),
available at http://www.ctunet.com/blog/text/2012-CA-0009-C-ULP-Complai
nt-Notice-of-Hearing-Coerced-Concessions-without-fax.pdf. The matter was
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settled by CTU and CPS. See Teachers’ Union, Chicago School Officials Settle
Legal Dispute over Length of School Day, National School Boards Association
Legal Clips, Nov., 8, 2011, available at http://legalclips.nsba.org/?p=10095.
[143] Section 12(b) of the IELRA provides that the parties are required to resolve
their dispute or impasse through an agreed-upon dispute resolution procedure
which includes a rotating mediation panel which may, at the request of either
party, issue advisory findings of fact and recommendations. 115 ILCS 5/12(b). CPS
and CTU have had an agreement setting up such a procedure since 2003, when
this language was added to the IELRA. See also CPS-SEIU Local 73 2007-2012
Collective Bargaining Agreement, App. C, Mediation Process Under Section 4.5 of
the IELRA, available at http://www.cps-humanresources.org/Employee/Fo
rms/UnionCont/Local73/Local%2073%20%28full%20with%20bookmarks%29.
pdf.
[144] At the time, CPS and CTU were involved in litigation before the IELRB and
state courts. The issue was whether the IELRB had jurisdiction to hear alleged
union discrimination and bad faith bargaining ULPs stemming from negotiations
regarding wage increases under the existing collective bargaining agreement and
CPS’s decision to lay off teachers (a permissive subject of bargaining under section
4.5 of the IELRA), when CTU did not agree to forgo such increases. The IELRB
issued a complaint, see Chicago Teachers Union and Chicago Bd. of Educ., No.
2011-CA-0033-C (IELRB 2011), which CPS unsuccessfully attempted to block
through the courts, arguing that the IELRA did not have jurisdiction over the
matter, as any dispute or impasse involving the layoff decision was subject to the
dispute resolution process set forth in sections 4.5(b) and 12(b) of the IELRA. See
Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. IELRB, 28 PERI ¶ 42, 2011 Ill.App.
(1st) 111696 (August 22, 2011) (holding that the IELRB and not the court has the
jurisdiction to interpret the IELRA to determine whether the ULP procedures of
section 15 or the alternative dispute resolution procedures of section 4.5(b) and
12(b) apply). PC-proposed language, which was written by CPS and would have
undercut the IELRB and CTU in this pending litigation, had been included in SB 7
when it passed the Senate in April 2011, because those who drafted the final Senate
language did not know of the pending litigation. This led to the problems
regarding the unions’ support of SB 7 in May 2011, which resulted in the
compromise language included in the final legislation passed by both houses. See
supra notes 83, 86 for further discussion of this issue.
[145] In 2008, the unions and school management worked together to propose a
streamlining of the dismissal process, that was included in Senate Amendment 6
to SB 2288. Unfortunately, that bill, which also included an income tax increase
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and many of the education reform concepts which had been proposed in the
original Burnham Plan, did not pass. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying
text.
[146] This had not been an issue in CPS since 1995, when the law was changed so
that the independent hearing officer did not make the final decision on whether a
teacher was dismissed, but only made a recommendation to the district, which
then made the final decision. See Illinois School Code § 34-85, 105 ILCS 5/34-85.
[147] Many teachers did not appeal, as the unions advised them that their cases did
not have sufficient merit.
[148] The parties could agree to an alternative method of selecting a hearing
officer, such as through the American Arbitration Association. Illinois School
Code § 24-12, 105 ILCS 24-12; Illinois School Code 34-85, 105 ILCS 5/34-85.
[149] The law (section 24-12 of the School Code) provided that the hearing had to
be scheduled before an independent hearing officer on a date no less than 15 nor
more than 30 days after the school board passed a motion to dismiss the
teacher. Practically, that scheduling was a mere formality, and the actual start of
the hearing was postponed for months.
[150] Many of these matters, however, ended without a hearing, as the parties
during the period of time between the school district’s act to dismiss the teacher
and the start of the hearing would settle the matter. Furthermore, the time delay
often worked to the advantage of the school district, as during this period the
teacher was not receiving any compensation. While the teacher could receive back
pay if successful in challenging the district’s dismissal decision, the pressure of not
having income during the interim led to a good number of settlements.
[151] The School Management Alliance approach closely resembled PC’s, but
expanded it to cover conduct as well as performance dismissals. See supra notes
64, 69. PC was just focused on the process by which teachers were dismissed for
poor performance.
[152] See Performance Counts, supra note 62.
[153] For CPS, it turned one process into two because, as mentioned in note 142,
since 1995 the hearing officer in CPS dismissal cases only makes a
recommendation regarding dismissal rather than the decision.
[154] See Illinois School Code § 24-16.5, 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5.
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[155] See Illinois School Code § 24-12(d)(6), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(6).
[156] See Illinois School Code § 24-16.5(d)(3), 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(d)(3). Under all
three dismissal processes, for good cause (as defined in the law) or by mutual
agreement of the parties, the start and end of dates of a hearing or the number of
days each party has to present their case can be modified. The hearing officer also
can modify on his own the time a party has to present its case. See Illinois School
Code § 24-12(d)(6), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(6); Illinois School Code § 24-16.5(a),
105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(a); Illinois School Code § 34-85(a)(5), 105 ILCS 5/3485(a)(5).
[157] Under the dismissal system in place for dismissals which occur on or before
June 30, 2012, ISBE pays the full cost of the hearing officer. See Illinois School
Code § 24-12(d)(5), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(5); Illinois School Code § 34-85(a)(4),
105 ILCS 5/34-85(a)(4).
[158] CPS will no longer use an ISBE-provided list. Instead, the list will now be
developed by the school district in good faith consultation with CTU and
CPAA. See Illinois School Code § 34-85(a)(3), 105 ILCS 5/34-85(a)(3).
[159] Illinois School Code § 24-12(d)(3)(ii), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(3)(ii).
[160] This is essentially modeled after the system which has been used in CPS since
1995.
[161] See Illinois School Code § 24-12(d)(8), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(8).
[162] See Illinois School Code § 24-12(d)(9), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(9). Without this
safeguard, the court would only review the school district’s decision and not the
contrary recommendation of the hearing officer. See, e.g.,Hearne v. Bd. of Educ.
of City of Chicago, 322 Ill.App.3d 467, 749 N.E.2d 411 (1st Dist. 2001).
[163] See Illinois School Code § 24A-, 105 ILCS 5/24A-5.
[164] See Illinois School Code § 24-16.5(c)(4, 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(c)(4).
[165] See Illinois School Code § 24-16.5(c)(3, 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(c)(3).
[166] See Illinois School Code § 24-16.5(c)(1) & (2), 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(c)(1) &
(2).
[167] To remediate, the teacher must receive an evaluation of proficient or better
at the end of the remediation period.
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[168] This training will not be as comprehensive as the training all evaluators must
successfully complete in order to conduct valid evaluations beginning September
1, 2012. See Illinois School Code § 24A-3(b), 105 ILCS 5/24A-3(b).
[169] In the hearing, “the teacher may only challenge the substantive and
procedural aspects of (i) the ‘unsatisfactory’ performance evaluation rating that led
to the remediation, (ii) the remediation plan, and (iii) the final remediation
evaluation. To the extent the teacher challenges procedural aspects, including any
in applicable collective bargaining agreement provisions, of a relevant
performance evaluation rating or remediation plan, the teacher must demonstrate
how an alleged procedural defect materially affected the teacher’s ability to
demonstrate a level of performance necessary to avoid remediation or dismissal or
successfully completed the remediation plan. Without any such material effect, a
procedural defect shall not impact the assessment by the hearing officer, board, or
reviewing court of the validity of a performance evaluation or a remediation plan.”
Illinois School Code § 24-16.5(d)(2)(B), 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(d)(2)(B). Also, the
hearing officer can only consider and weigh the original unsatisfactory evaluation
which led to the teacher’s remediation and the evaluations given during and at the
end of the remediation period. Illinois School Code § 24-16(d)(2)(C), 105 ILCS
5/24-16.5(d)(2)(C). In a regular performance evaluation dismissal hearing, the
foregoing restrictions do not for the most part exist. Hearing officers have more
discretion regarding what evidence to consider, which often does include, for
example, the teacher’s evaluation history.
[170] See Illinois School Code § 24-16.5(g), 105 ILCS 5/24-16.5(g). The standard
on review is that the school district’s decision may be reverse only if it is found to
be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the
law. If the hearing officer did not recommend that the teacher be dismissed, but
the district still dismissed her, the standard of review is whether the district’s
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
[171] See Illinois School Code § 24-11, 105 ILCS 5/24-11; Illinois School Code § 3484, 105 ILCS 5/34-84.
[172] Contrary to popular myth, once a teacher acquires tenure she is not immune
from being dismissed. Prior to SB 7, she was entitled to 1) employment from year
to year unless laid off or dismissed for cause, 2) due process rights in the event of
dismissal for cause and 3) priority over non-tenured teachers in a layoff. With the
passage of SB 7, the latter tenure benefit no longer exists, unless the teacher is
covered by a grandfathered collective bargaining agreement. See Illinois School
Code § 24-12(b), 105 ILCS 24-12(b).

SPRING 2012

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

71

[173] Prior to 1998, a teacher had to complete two consecutive years of full-time
service and be re-employed for a third year in order to acquire tenure. If the
teacher had no prior teaching experience, a school district could extend the
number of years to acquire tenure to three.
[174] For the specific section in current law, see Illinois School Code § 24-11(f),
105 ILCS 5/24-11(f). In CPS, it appears that written reasons are required for
nonrenewals at the end of any probationary year. See Illinois School Code § 3484, 105 ILCS 5/34-84.
[175] See, e.g., Howard v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport School Dist. No. 145, 160
Ill.App.3d 309, 513 N.E.2d 545 (2d Dist., 1987); Burns v. Bd. of Educ. of Fairfield
School Dist. No. 112 of Wayne County, 47 Ill.App.3d 589, 362 N.E.2d 353 (5th
Dist., 1977); Wade v. Granite City Community Unit School Dist. No. 9, 71
Ill.App.2d 34, 218 N.E.2d 19 (5th Dist. 1966).
[176] The improvements to the performance evaluation process required by PERA
were a critical factor in the unions’ position. See supra notes 40-51 and
accompanying text.
[177] The School Management Alliance proposed to immediately begin tying
evaluations to tenure acquisition. See supra notes 64, 69.
[178] See, e.g., Senate Amendment 1 to SB 2686, 95th General Assembly,
introduced in 2008, available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/95/SB/PDF
/09500SB2686sam001.pdf.
[179] See supra notes 62, 64 & 69 and accompanying text.
[180] See supra note 45 for an explanation of the new four category evaluation
ratings.
[181] See Illinois School Code § 24-11(d)(1), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d)(1). If a school
direct fails to evaluate a teacher in a given year, then the teacher will be deemed to
have received a proficient evaluation for tenure acquisition purposes. See Illinois
School Code § 24-11(d), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d).
[182] See Illinois School Code § 24-11(d), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d). The parties also
came to an agreement on what would constitute a school term for tenure
acquisition purposes. A nagging issue for districts, unions and teachers had been
how many days must a teacher work for the school term to count. In light of a
2008 Appellate Court decision, Wood v. North Wamac School District No. 186,
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368 Ill.App.3d 874, 899 N.E.2d 578 (5th Dist.) (school term in which teacher didn’t
work but was on a paid leave of absence counted for tenure acquisition purposes),
the parties all proposed statutorily defining the minimum number of days of work
needed for a school term to count. They agreed that it would be 120 days (150 days
in CPS), provided that days of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave that a
teacher is required to take until the end of a school term are to be considered days
of work. Under the FMLA, a school district can delay a teacher’s return from FMLA
leave at the end of a school term. See 29 U.S.C. § 2618(d); 29 C.F.R. § 825.602.
Furthermore, if a teacher falls below the 120 days minimum so the school term
does not count for tenure acquisition purposes, that year will not be considered a
break-in-service which would require the teacher to restart the time period for
acquiring tenure, as long as the teacher returns to work in the school district the
following school term. See Illinois School Code § 24-12(e), 105 ILCS 5/24-12(e);
Illinois School Code § 34-84, 105 ILCS 5/34-84.
[183] See supra note 69 for a comparison of the proposals. In addition, the teacher
would have to be reemployed for the following school term in order for tenure to
accrue.
[184] See Illinois School Code § 24-11(d)(2), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d)(2).
[185] See supra note 69.
[186] See Illinois School Code § 24-11(d)(3), 105 ILCS 5/24-11(d)(3).
[187] As mentioned earlier, under existing law, if a school district nonrenews a
teacher at the end of the fourth probationary year, it must provide specific written
reasons for doing so. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
[188] There already are discussions on trailer legislation to clarify and tweak some
parts of SB 7. Furthermore, implementation of these laws may very well reveal
provisions which should be modified.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By, Student Editorial Board:
Zachary Budden, Amanda Clark, Thomas Ryan, and Dustin Watkins
Recent Developments is a regular feature of The Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
collective bargaining statutes and the Family Medical Leave Act.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Appropriate Bargaining Units

In Board of Trustees of University of Illinois. v. IELRB, 2012 IL App (4th) 110836,
2012 WL 966457 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. Mar. 22, 2012), the Illinois Appellate Court for
the 4th District reversed the IELRB’s certification of UIC United Faculty, AFTIFT as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit consisting of tenured,
tenure-track, and non-tenure track faculty at the Chicago campus of the University
of Illinois. The union had filed a majority-interest petition on April 29, 2011 with
the IELRB proposing a bargaining unit consisting of both tenure-system faculty
and non-tenure track faculty for the Chicago campus. An administrative law judge
issued a recommended decision certifying the bargaining unit. A three-member
majority of the IELRB rejected the university’s exceptions to the ALJ’s
recommendation and, with one Board member dissenting, certified the union as
the exclusive bargaining representative for the bargaining unit composed of tenure
and non-tenure track faculty. The University appealed.
The court observed that the first paragraph of IELRA § 7(a) directs the IELRB to
make case-by-case determinations of the appropriateness of proposed bargaining
units by considering several different factors. However, the second paragraph of §
7(a) removes the Board’s authority to make case-by-case determinations for
tenured and tenure-track faculty at each campus of the University of Illinois.
Instead, the statute describes the “sole appropriate bargaining unit” for such
faculty. The second paragraph of § 7(a) provides:
The sole appropriate bargaining unit for tenured and tenure-track academic faculty at
each campus of the University of Illinois shall be a unit that is comprised of nonsupervisory academic faculty employed more than half-time and that includes all tenured
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and tenure-track faculty of that University campus employed by the board of trustees in
all of the campus’s undergraduate, graduate, and professional schools and degree and
non-degree programs (with the exception of the college of medicine, the college of
pharmacy, the college of dentistry, the college of law, and the college of veterinary
medicine, each of which shall have its own separate unit), regardless of current or
historical representation rights or patterns or the application of any other factors. Any
decision, rule, or regulation promulgated by the Board to the contrary shall be null and
void.

The issue before the court centered on the meaning of the following portion of the
second paragraph of § 7(a): “a unit that is comprised of non-supervisory
academic faculty employed more than half-time and that includes all tenured and
tenure-track faculty of that University;” specifically the meaning of the two
adjective clauses, the “that” clauses, in the quoted section of the statute.
The IELRB argued the first adjective clause (“that is comprised of non-supervisory
academic faculty employed more than half-time”) described the whole bargaining
unit and the second adjective clause (“that includes all tenured and tenure-track
faculty of that University campus”) described only a part of the whole unit. The
university, however, interpreted the second adjective clause as referring to the
entire bargaining unit; the unit must be composed of all the tenured and tenuretrack faculty of the campus, excluding all other employees.
The IELRB argued that the university’s interpretation suffered from two major
flaws. First, the university’s construction of the statute contradicted the ordinary
meaning of the word “include.” The term “include” typically has a different
meaning than the term “comprise;” “include” ordinarily means “to take in
or comprise as a part of a whole” and to be “comprised of” means to “be
composed of” or to “consist of.” The word “include” suggests the
containment of something as constituent, component, or subordinate part of a
larger whole.
Second, the IELRB argued, if the first and second adjective clauses describe the
entire bargaining unit, then it is unclear why both clauses were needed in the
second paragraph of § 7(a). If the legislature intended “include” to have the same
meaning as “is comprised of,” there is no explanation why the legislature used both
verbs in consecutive clauses modifying the same predicate noun. The IELRB
argued the natural inference from the legislature’s choice to use two different verbs
is that the words were intended to have different meanings.
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The university responded that if the word “includes” were given its plain meaning,
referring to a “subset of a larger universe of possible items,” the sentence would be
reduced to a tautology. The IELRB’s interpretation would make the phrase
“includes tenured and tenure-track faculty” meaningless. Second, the university
argued, the IELRB’s interpretation involved a fatal conflict. Section 7(a) sets out to
define “the sole appropriate bargaining unit for tenured and tenure-track
academic faculty;” however, under the IELRB’s interpretation, the statute
describes different possible compositions of the bargaining unit. The university
argued this interpretation was impermissible; the statute cannot be read to state
the sole permissible bargaining unit may be one several different compositions.
The court found both interpretations flawed, ultimately reaching the conclusion
that the second paragraph of § 7(a) is ambiguous. The court reasoned that while
the university’s interpretation avoided the conflict between the complete subject
(“the sole bargaining unit”) and the subject complement (“a unit that is comprised
of non-supervisory academic faculty employed more than half-time and that
includes all tenured and tenure-track faculty of that University campus”), this
interpretation required redefining the term “includes” to mean “is comprised of”
even though the legislature used the two distinct terms in consecutive clauses. The
IELRB’s interpretation, on the other hand, upheld the ordinary meaning of the two
clauses, but at the cost of accepting a conflict between the complete subject and the
subject complement. Finding both interpretations to be unsatisfactory, the court
turned to the legislative history to help determine the meaning of the two adjective
clauses.
In 1996, § 7(a) was amended to add the second paragraph. Unlike the current
language of § 7(a), when the second paragraph was added in 1996 it provided the
only appropriate unit for faculty of the university was a unit including all tenured,
tenure-track, and nontenure-track faculty. Since the three types of faculty
comprise all possible faculty employed by the university, in the earlier version of
the second paragraph “includes” could not mean “the containment of something
as a constituent, component, or subordinate part of a larger whole,” but was used
in a manner synonymous with “is comprised of.”
On January 1, 2004 the second paragraph of § 7(a) was changed to the language at
issue in this case. Section 7(a) no longer described the entire “academic faculty” of
the university as a whole, but instead described the appropriate unit for “tenured
and tenure-track faculty.” The court noted the amendment of a statute typically
evinces a legislative intention to change the law, not to keep the law as it is. Further,
logic suggests words left unchanged by an amendment are intended to have the
same meaning as before. This lead the court to conclude that “includes” in the
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current version of § 7(a) has the same meaning as in the prior version: “is
comprised of.” By deleting the word “and nontenure-track” from the second
adjective clause, the legislature intended to change the law by providing the sole
appropriate bargaining unit for tenure and tenure-track faculty on a campus
consists only of the tenured and tenure-track faculty on that campus.
Finally, the Court found support for its assumption that nontenure-track faculty
were not intended to be included in the permissible bargaining unit based on
statements made by the bill’s sponsor. Comments made by the sponsor, Senator
Maloney, only focused on the formation of bargaining units by tenured and tenuretrack faculty and did not mention nontenure-track faculty at all. This led the court
to conclude the IELRB’s interpretation of § 7(a) was contrary to the legislative
intent.
The Court concluded, in light of the legislative history and the competing
interpretations of the second paragraph of § 7(a), that the legislature intended the
sole appropriate bargaining unit for tenured and tenure-track faculty at each
campus to be exclusively comprised of all nonsupervisory tenured and tenuretrack faculty at the campus who were employed more than halftime. The Court
reversed the IELRB’s certification of the bargaining unit including tenure and
non-tenure-track faculty.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Duty to Supply Information

In Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council and Illinois Secretary of State,
S-CA-11-016 (ILRB State Panel 2012), the ILRB State Panel held that the Secretary
of State did not breach its duty to bargain when it refused to provide the Illinois
Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (FOP) a copy of an audit report by the
Office of Inspector General.
The Inspector General audits all Secretary of State departments and distributes a
final report to directors and administrators with a cover page indicating that it is a
confidential document that should not be distributed to others. In 2008, the
Inspector General audited the Secretary of State Department of Police. The report
involved interviews with employees covering topics that included terms and
conditions of employment such as scheduling, training, efficiency, equipment,
safety, manpower, how to improve the department, and their thoughts about
department operations.The FOP requested a copy of the audit report shortly after
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the parties began negotiating a new contract. The Secretary of State refused to turn
over the audit. Both, the ALJ and the State Panel agreed that the Secretary of
State’s refusal did not violate § 10(a)(4) because the employer’s interest in
maintaining confidentiality of the audit outweighed the FOP’s interest in a
copy. The audit dealt with an internal assessment of the department’s operations
and its value would be compromised if exposed to the general public. Most of the
information, the decision noted, would also be available to the FOP through its
members.
The parties had also agreed to ground rules for the contract negotiations that stated
that“both parties agree to exchange information or comply with reasonable
requests for information as long as that information is available to the parties, at
no cost.” The ALJ concluded that the refusal to provide the audit violated the
parties’ ground rules, and the breach of the ground rules violated §§ 10(a)(4)
and (1). The State Panel disagreed that the single failure to hand over the audit
amounted to an unfair labor practice, relying on County of Kane (Kane County
Sherriff), 4 PERI ¶2031 (IL SLRB 1988), which held that disputes over ground
rules should not be permitted to deter negotiations over wages, hours and terms
and conditions of employment. To allow a disruption to negotiations would
compromise the policy of the Act to promote collective bargaining. The State Panel
reversed this part of the ALJ’s decision.
III.

FMLA DEVELOPMENTS

A.

State Sovereign Immunity

In Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S.Ct. 1327 (2012), the United
States Supreme Court, with a four-justice plurality, held that states are immune
from monetary damage lawsuits predicated on the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) provision that gives employees a right to leave to care for their own serious
medical conditions – the FMLA’s self-care provision. 29 U.S.C § 2612(a)(1)(D)
(2008).
When Congress enacted the FMLA in 1993 it expressly authorized a cause of action
against employers, including public employers, for violating or interfering with the
rights the FMLA bestowed. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). Such language purported to
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity to suits for money damages. However,
prior decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution have held that Congress lacks authority to abrogate state sovereign
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immunity when it acts pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, but
has such authority when it acts pursuant to its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to implement the Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the
laws.
Daniel Coleman was an employee of the Maryland Court of Appeals. After
requesting sick leave, Mr. Coleman was given two choices:resignation or
termination. Mr. Coleman sued the Maryland Court of Appeals for, inter alia,
violating the FMLA’s self-care provision. The district court dismissed and the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Both held that as an entity of the
sovereign State of Maryland, the Court of Appeals was immune from liability in an
employee’s suit for damages.
In addition to granting a right to leave for self-care, the FMLA grants a right to
leave to care for family members with serious medical conditions. 29 U.S.C. §
2612(a)(1)(C). In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs. 538 U.S. 721
(2003), the Supreme Court upheld a right of action for family-care based damage
suits, holding that the abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity was a valid of
exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under § 5 the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Coleman plurality distinguished Hibbs, finding that with
respect to the family care provision of the FMLA, Congress relied on clear,
documented evidence of sex-based discrimination in family-leave policies.
Justice Kennedy writing for the Coleman plurality noted that the Hibbs “holding
rested on evidence that States had family-leave policies that differentiated on the
basis of sex and that States administered even neutral family-leave policies in ways
that discriminated on the basis of sex.”To Congress, and the Court, these
documented practices constituted transgressions against the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive equal protection guarantee against sex
discrimination, including, “sex-role stereotyp[ing] that caring for family
members is women’s work.” Therefore, in Hibbs, there was “a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end,” as required by the Court’s prior decision in City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy noted, the legislative history for the FMLA’s
self-care provision “reveals a concern for the economic burdens on the employee
and the employee’s family resulting from illness-related job loss and a concern
for discriminating on the basis of illness, not sex.” Furthermore, the legislative
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record at the time of the FMLA’s enactment demonstrated that 95 to 96 percent
of state employees were covered by a paid sick-leave or a short-term disability plan.
As a result, evening assuming there existed a transgression in need of remedy,
abrogating states’ immunity when existing policies were sufficient “is not a
congruent and proportional remedy.”
The plurality also rejected an argument that the self-care provision was a necessary
adjunct to support the family-care provision. Justice Kennedy described the
necessary adjunct argument as “supposition and conjecture.” Coleman’s final
argument in support of State liability under the self-care provision invoked
disparate impact against single parents, the majority of whom are women. To the
plurality, however, disparate impact evidence of discrimination may be relevant,
but “alone it is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation even where the
Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny.”
Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor
dissented. Justice Ginsburg criticized the plurality as paying “scant attention to
the overarching aim of the FMLA.” To the dissenting Justices, text and legislative
history revealed that Congress’s purpose with the self-care provision was to
address sex discrimination in the workplace. Justice Ginsburg described the selfcare provision as one necessary to equal-treatment feminist concerns that without
a gender-neutral self-care provision the FMLA’s authorization of self-care for
pregnancy and childbirth-related medical issues would actually create an incentive
for employers to discriminate in hiring women. Therefore, by including §
2612(a)(1)(D)’s gender-neutral self-care provision, and thereby equalizing
among the sexes the same possibility for twelve weeks of self-care leave, the FMLA
serves to protect against discrimination against women, particularly child bearing
women. Justice Ginsberg described the self-care provision as “an appropriate
response to pervasive discriminatory treatment of pregnant women.”
Justice Scalia, concurring only in the judgment, applauded both the plurality and
the dissent for their respective “faithful application[s]” of the congruent and
proportional test. Justice Scalia used the opposite outcomes derived from the
plurality’s and the dissent’s application of the same analysis to criticize the
Court’s congruence and proportionality jurisprudence as a “flabby test” ripe
for “judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.” Instead, Justice
Scalia urged that an analysis of Congress’s power under § 5 be limited to “the
regulation of conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”
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Justice Thomas also concurred in the result. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Thomas reiterated his view that Hibbs was wrongly decided.

